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ARTICLES 
 
Deliberating the Divine 
ON EXTENDING THE JUSTIFICATION FROM TRUTH  
TO RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION 
John M. Kang† 
The justification from truth represents the most 
prominent basis of legal support for the right of free speech.1 
President Lee Bollinger at Columbia University, a First 
Amendment scholar and a former law school dean at the 
University of Michigan, has stated that the search for truth is 
  
 † Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University, Miami (jkang@stu.edu). 
B.A., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles; 
M.A., Ph.D., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. I would like to thank the following 
people who have either read the manuscript or discussed some of the ideas therein with 
me, although none should be understood as necessarily endorsing anything in the 
Article: Monsignor Andy Anderson, Steve Clark, Lauren Gilbert, Dan Gordon, Brad 
Joondeph, Jeremy Paul, and Kim Smith. Amanda Bell and Damaris Rosich-Schwartz 
provided research assistance. Lynn Bridgers, Don Herzog, and Lenora Ledwon helped 
me with secondary sources, and Scott E. Page kindly gave me access to the galley 
proofs for his then forthcoming book on diversity and deliberation. I presented a 
version of this Article at the 2006 meeting of the Association for the Study of Law, 
Culture and Humanities at Syracuse University. This Article is for Jung Won Kwak, 
with whom I have argued many times about truth, religious and otherwise.   
 1 See William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First 
Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“The most influential argument 
supporting the constitutional commitment to freedom of speech is the contention that 
speech is valuable because it leads to the discovery of truth.”). The First Amendment 
scholar Frederick Schauer has also commented: “Throughout the ages many diverse 
arguments have been employed to attempt to justify a principle of freedom of speech. 
Of all these, the predominant and most persevering has been the argument that free 
speech is particularly valuable because it leads to the discovery of truth.” FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15 (1982). C. Edwin Baker also 
writes: “Marketplace notions are not the only strains to be heard in the chorus of Court 
pronouncements on the first amendment. . . . Nevertheless, the marketplace theory 
dominates; and its rejection would have major implications for first amendment 
interpretation.” C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment: Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964, 973-74 (1978); see also infra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.  
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the “dominant value” of free speech in our contemporary 
democracy.2 He explains:  
In today’s discourse about free speech, the dominant value 
associated with speech is its role in getting at the truth, or the 
advancement of knowledge. Speech is the means by which people 
convey information and ideas, by which they communicate 
viewpoints and propositions and hypotheses, which can then be 
tested against the speech of others. Through the process of open 
discussion we find out what we ourselves think and are then able to 
compare that with what others think on the same issues. The end 
result of this process, we hope, is that we will arrive at as close an 
approximation of the truth as we can.3 
In the passage, the justification from truth appears to be 
underwritten by a degree of agnosticism or a temporary 
suspension of belief regarding normative matters, that is, ideas 
  
 2 LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 45 (1986).  
 3 Id. Thomas Emerson explains: 
[F]reedom of expression is an essential process for advancing knowledge and 
discovering truth. An individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear 
all sides of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judgment by 
exposing it to opposition, and make full use of different minds. Discussion 
must be kept open no matter how certainly true an accepted opinion may 
seem to be; many of the most widely acknowledged truths have turned out to 
be erroneous. Conversely, the same principle applies no matter how false or 
pernicious the new opinion appears to be; for the unaccepted opinion may be 
true or partially true and, even if wholly false, its presentation and open 
discussion compel a rethinking and retesting of the accepted opinion. 
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970); see also 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785-86 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing 
the potential for speech to contribute to truth).  
  Of course, the justification from truth is not without its critics. Stanley 
Ingber remains skeptical about the basic assumptions inherent in the justification from 
truth. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 
1, 1. His criticisms deserve the kind of careful replies that would take me outside the 
scope of this Article, although I do address some of the objections. C. Edwin Baker also 
writes that the “hope that the marketplace leads to truth, or even to the best or most 
desirable decision, becomes implausible” given that, among other things, the economic 
and social resources necessary to spread one’s ideas are not distributed equally in 
society. Baker, supra note 1, at 974, 978. For more criticisms of the justification from 
truth, see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 12-17 (1989); see 
also infra notes 112-125 and accompanying text.  
  For the moment, however, perhaps it will suffice to say that the 
justification from truth is the dominant view in the Supreme Court with regard to the 
right of free speech. Even critics of the justification from truth feel compelled to 
acknowledge this fact. Professor Baker thus declares that the “marketplace of ideas 
theory consistently dominates the Supreme Court’s discussions of freedom of speech.” 
BAKER, supra note 1, at 7 (footnote omitted). In this Article, I work from the premise 
that the search for truth is the dominant justification for the right of free speech in the 
Supreme Court, and I examine the ways in which it can be applied to religious 
expression.  
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about what is right and wrong.4 The right of free speech under 
this justification is not logically tied to any particular 
substantive outcome of public discourse. The right is, as a 
formal matter, only committed to a process whereby we 
“communicate viewpoints and propositions and hypotheses, 
which can then be tested against the speech of others.”5 Under 
this justification from truth, we value the right of free speech 
not principally for the speaker’s sake but for that of the 
audience. For it is the audience that wishes to be exposed to 
viewpoints and ideas about which they can deliberate.6  
The justification from truth possesses a majestic and 
rich history in both Western political theory as well as federal 
Supreme Court cases, and it has enlisted the considerable 
powers of figures like John Stuart Mill and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.7 So attractive has been the justification that it has 
been conscripted by judges in the areas of political speech,8 
commercial speech,9 and even pornography.10 Curiously, 
  
 4 Similarly, Bollinger has suggested that the toleration demanded of us by 
the First Amendment requires “a willingness to compromise and a willingness even to 
accept total defeat. . . . Democracy, like literature, it may be said, requires a kind of 
suspension of disbelief.” BOLLINGER, supra note 2, at 117. Frederick Schauer has also 
stressed the fallibilism of the justification of truth by clarifying that the justification 
seeks “knowledge,” which can be provisional as opposed to “certainty” which cannot. 
SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 16, 18.  
 5 BOLLINGER, supra note 2. Robert Post offers a similar treatment of public 
discourse and the First Amendment. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: 
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 277-78 (1995). Frederick Schauer also argues 
that according to the argument from truth, “[o]pen discussion, free exchange of ideas, 
freedom of enquiry, and freedom to criticize . . . are necessary conditions for the 
effective functioning of the process of searching for truth.” SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 
15.  
 6 Perhaps the most well known presentation of this view in the legal 
literature comes from Alexander Meiklejohn’s justification for free speech in a 
democracy. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 24-27 (Kennikat Press 1972) (1948); see also OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF 
FREE SPEECH 2-3 (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE 
SPEECH 18-20 (1993).   
 7 See infra Part I.  
 8 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (urging a judicial attitude toward political speech that has faith in “the 
power of reason as applied through public discussion”), overruled in part by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444; Gitlow v. New York 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (advocating that competing political perspectives “should be 
given their chance and have their way”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (defending political speech on the view that “the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market”).  
 9 See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977) 
(rejecting a prohibition on commercial speech that tries to achieve “its goal by 
restricting the free flow of truthful information”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (justifying commercial speech on 
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however, it has made relatively little ingress into the area of 
religious expression, as the subject of either the Court’s 
jurisprudence11 or the scholarly literature.12 I believe that the 
  
the premise that “people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well 
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of 
communication rather than to close them”).  
 10 See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(arguing that the government should permit a diversity of viewpoints about 
pornography and that “the government may not restrict speech on the ground that in a 
free exchange truth is not yet dominant”). 
 11 The Court has offered a glimmer of what an extension of the justification 
from truth to religious expression might look like. Justice Roberts for the Court in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut provided just two sentences:  
To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at 
times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, 
prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of 
this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the 
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, 
essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens 
of a democracy. 
310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). So, too, Justice Black wrote only brief remarks alluding to the 
justification from truth in his majority opinion in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 
(1946), in which he rejected a company town’s efforts to preclude Jehovah’s Witnesses 
from entering the town and distributing leaflets to the company workers: “To act as 
good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed 
their information must be uncensored.” Id. at 508. For further discussion of Marsh, see 
infra notes 286-294 and accompanying text. 
  The Supreme Court has traditionally framed the right of religious 
expression in terms of whether a government statute violates a person’s right to 
religious conscience or belief. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) (rejecting a 
state-sanctioned religious exercise “in which the student was left with no alternative 
but to submit”); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
877 (1990) (“The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe 
and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”), superseded by statute, Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488; Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985) (The “[c]ourt has unambiguously concluded that the 
individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right 
to select any religious faith or none at all.”); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. 
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981) (“Where the state conditions receipt 
of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies 
such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting 
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a 
burden upon religion exists.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 
(1947) (arguing that neither the state nor the federal government “can pass laws which 
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another”); United States v. 
Ballard 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (citation omitted) (“Freedom of thought, which includes 
freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right to 
maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to 
followers of the orthodox faiths.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in . . . religion, or other 
matters of opinion . . . .”); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (“Freedom of conscience and 
freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual 
may choose cannot be restricted by law.”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871) (“In 
this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any 
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religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws 
of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to 
all.”). 
  Law professors have also commented on the view that the Supreme Court’s 
religion clauses are used to protect the right of religious belief and conscience. 
Laurence Tribe explains:  
Allocating religious choices to the unfettered consciences of individuals under 
the free exercise clause remains, in part, a means of assuring that church and 
state do not unite to create the many dangers and divisions often implicit in 
such an established union. Similarly, forbidding the excessive identification 
of church and state through the establishment clause remains, in part, a 
means of assuring that government does not excessively intrude upon 
religious liberty. Thus the Supreme Court has frequently recognized that “the 
two clauses may overlap.”  
TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1156-57 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
222 (1963)); see also DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 128-
33, 141-49 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the religion 
clauses reflect a Western tradition of protecting the right to conscience); Arlin M. 
Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1559, 1643 (1989) (“The core value of the religion clauses is liberty of conscience in 
religious matters, an ideal which recurs throughout American history from the colonial 
period of Roger Williams to the early national period of the Founders.”); Noah 
Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 
90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 676-77 (2002) (“For the Framers, the [Establishment] Clause was 
understood to protect religious conscience, and so the answer was straightforward: 
religion deserved special protection from alliance with government because, more than 
other forms of action or belief, religion required free choice to be meaningful.” (footnote 
omitted)); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 398 (2002) (“In the time between the proposal of the Constitution 
and of the Bill of Rights, the predominant, not to say exclusive, argument against 
established churches was that they had the potential to violate liberty of conscience.”); 
Kent Greenawalt, Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Understandings of 
the Religion Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 492 (2006) (“Whatever may be true 
about the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause seemed a natural way to 
protect liberty of religious conscience.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and 
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1480-99, 
1511-13 (1990) (arguing that the original understanding of the free exercise clause was 
based exclusively on the right of religionists to be faithful to their consciences); Jay 
Alan Sekulow, James Matthew Henderson, Sr., & Kevin E. Broyles, Religious Freedom 
and the First Self-Evident Truth: Equality as a Guiding Principle in Interpreting the 
Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 351, 387 (1995) (“Under the equality 
understanding, the Establishment Clause protects every citizen’s right to make 
voluntary choices regarding religion by forbidding the government from using its power 
to join the marketplace of ideas on the side of any belief, regardless of whether it favors 
or disfavors religion.”); Rodney K. Smith & Patrick A. Shea, Religion and the Press: 
Keeping First Amendment Values in Balance, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 177, 202 (“The 
Establishment Clause limitation protects against a particular religion or group of 
religions commandeering the state in a manner that infringes on the liberty of 
conscience of others” and the “free exercise limitation, in turn, protects the right to act 
upon one’s religious conscience unless, in the words of James Madison, ‘the 
preservation of equal liberty, and the existence of the State be manifestly 
endangered.’ ”).  
 12 Professor William P. Marshall has offered a suggestive but underdeveloped 
and at times problematic argument for applying the justification from truth to religious 
expression. William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 
243, 244, 255-60 (1994). In this Article, I will sometimes explicitly mention our 
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justification from truth, given its heuristic power, deserves to 
be applied to religious expression, and I try to offer a robust 
account of what that would look like.13 In Part I, I distinguish 
what I call the minimalist and deliberative approaches of the 
justification from truth. The former, I argue, lacks the 
insistence on deliberation over a diversity of viewpoints that 
defines the latter. For this reason, I recommend the application 
of the deliberative version to religious expression. I clarify in 
Part II what challenges, if any, religious expression might 
present for the justification from truth given that the 
justification has been generally applied to secular speech. In 
Part III, I urge the merits of applying the deliberative version 
of the justification from truth by enlisting examples from 
religious conversion.  
I begin in Part IV the needful work of explaining how 
the Supreme Court has provided a long line of case law that 
can be conscripted to bolster my efforts to extend the 
justification from truth to discourses pertaining to religion. The 
Court has applied the justification from truth to political 
speech and commercial speech based partly on the assumption 
that politics and commerce are such important subjects that 
the audience deserves access to a diversity of viewpoints and 
ideas. So, too, the Court has also concluded, as I show in Part 
IV, that religion is at least as important as politics and 
commerce, a conclusion that has provided a path for me to 
extend the justification from truth to religion. I explain in  
Part V that the religion clauses, as interpreted by the Court, 
forbid the state from invading the privacy necessary for 
individuals to weigh competing religious perspectives, and, 
accordingly, the Court has afforded the legal means by which 
people may, without undue interference from the state, 
deliberate about a diversity of viewpoints and ideas about 
religion. In Part VI, I apply the justification from truth to a set 
of test cases to demonstrate how it can be used: cases involving 
proselytism, unemployment benefits, the flag salute, religious 
  
differences; other times I will simply offer, for efficiency’s sake, my own competing 
argument without referencing his. For instance, he does not differentiate between the 
two versions of the justification from truth. I consider the distinction crucial and 
explain why, albeit with only a passing reference to the fact that he makes no such 
distinction. See infra Part I. For an example of where I explicitly address our 
differences, see infra Part VI.C.1.  
 13 This does not mean that I necessarily seek to preempt other justifications 
for religious speech. My chief aim is to describe in detail one plausible justification for 
it which has been given relatively little attention.  
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fundamentalism, and the teaching of creation science. I 
conclude in Part VII.  
Before I begin making a case for applying the 
justification from truth to religious expression, I should more 
fully define the justification. I can begin by borrowing from 
Professor Frederick Schauer’s definition of the justification 
from truth:  
Throughout the ages many diverse arguments have been employed 
to attempt to justify a principle of freedom of speech. Of all these, the 
predominant and most persevering has been the argument that free 
speech is particularly valuable because it leads to the discovery of 
truth. Open discussion, free exchange of ideas, freedom of enquiry, 
and freedom to criticize, so the argument goes, are necessary 
conditions for the effective functioning of the process of searching for 
truth. Without this freedom we are said to be destined to stumble 
blindly between truth and falsehood. With it we can identify truth 
and reject falsity in any area of human enquiry.14  
This account of the justification from truth is a standard one 
and is relatively uncontroversial as far as the faithfulness of its 
description. But there is disagreement about what qualifies as 
truth and what are the expectations for free speech to help the 
audience arrive at it.  
This disagreement has organized itself in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence around two dominant approaches to the 
justification from truth: the minimalist approach and the 
deliberative approach. I will explain both approaches in the 
next section.  
I.  DELIBERATION IS AT THE CORE OF THE JUSTIFICATION  
In this section, I will summarize and assess what I call 
the Supreme Court’s minimalist and deliberative approaches to 
secular free speech, and then I will argue in Section III that the 
latter approach is more likely to help us arrive at better 
conclusions about religious truth. The minimalist approach 
does not assume that deliberation over competing viewpoints is 
necessary or perhaps even useful for arriving at the truth. By 
contrast, the deliberative approach, as its name suggests, 
values such deliberation.  
The history of the justification from truth in the United 
States Supreme Court finds its initial form in the minimalist 
approach and the topic of its consideration in political speech. 
  
 14 SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 15.  
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And the minimalist approach, like other significant modes of 
thought in American jurisprudence, begins for the Court with 
the towering authority of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
Representative is his dissent in Gitlow v. New York.15 Gitlow 
was, in the words of the Supreme Court, “a member of the Left 
Wing Section of the Socialist Party, a dissenting branch or 
faction of that party formed in opposition to its dominant policy 
of ‘moderate Socialism.’”16 The lower court convicted him of 
“advocacy of criminal anarchy,” a decision upheld by the 
Supreme Court, which found that Gitlow’s speech posed a 
“clear and present danger” that could be lawfully prohibited.17 
Dissenting, Holmes first summarized the position of Justice 
Sanford who wrote the majority opinion: “It is said that this 
manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement.”18 
But according to Holmes, Sanford’s description was unduly 
expansive because “[e]very idea is an incitement.”19 Every idea, 
he announced, “offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted 
on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of 
energy stifles the movement at its birth.”20 And Holmes wrote 
that the “only difference between the expression of an opinion 
and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s 
enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason.”21  
These remarks probably appear to afford great 
protection for free speech, but the logic of Holmes’s opinion, 
when carefully considered, presents a troubling upshot. While 
Holmes felt that the subversive speech in this case “had no 
chance of starting a present conflagration,” he nonetheless 
asserted that “[i]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in 
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the 
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free 
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their 
way.”22 Notice the breezy, if indifferent, attitude of the 
statement. According to Holmes, the “only meaning of free 
speech” is that people be permitted to hear a particular 
perspective, not that they mull over it or compare it with other 
  
 15 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 16 Id. at 655.  
 17 Id. at 654, 671-72.  
 18 Id. at 673. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 673. 
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options.23 On offer by Holmes is a formulation of the 
justification from truth that does not insist on the usefulness of 
deliberation and, accordingly, it also does not insist on a 
diversity of viewpoints, for deliberation is the “consideration 
and discussion of the reasons for and against a measure by a 
number of councilors.”24 Holmes’s version of the justification 
from truth is perfectly willing to ascribe political legitimacy to 
a superficial conclusion derived from glossing over a set of 
numbingly similar ideas and viewpoints.25  
While the justification from truth, on Holmes’s account, 
need not logically require deliberation, conclusions that are 
drawn without the benefit of seriously weighing competing 
arguments are potentially unsound because they have failed to 
withstand meaningful scrutiny. The nineteenth-century 
  
 23 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 26 (“In all his 
writings on free speech, Holmes pays little attention to the appropriate conditions 
under which free trade in ideas will ensure truth, a gap that is probably attributable to 
his skepticism about whether truth, as an independent value, is at issue at all.”). Some 
scholars have ascribed Holmes’s experience in the Civil War to his seeming apathy or 
skepticism concerning the existence of objective truths. See BOLLINGER, supra note 2, 
at 162 (arguing that Holmes’s contempt for intolerant men is “in part the product of 
Holmes’s experience as a soldier in the Civil War—that belief is a straight road to 
killing one another”).  
 24 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 414 (J. A. Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner eds., 
1989).  
 25 Some scholars have awkwardly associated Holmes with the philosophers 
John Stuart Mill and John Milton in that all three are said to be dedicated to the 
justification from truth. Stanley Ingber, for example, writes:  
Scholars and jurists frequently have used the image of a “marketplace of 
ideas” to explain and justify the first amendment freedoms of speech and 
press. Although this classic image of competing ideas and robust debate dates 
back to English philosophers John Milton and John Stuart Mill, Justice 
Holmes first introduced the concept into American jurisprudence in his 1919 
dissent to Abrams v. United States.  
Ingber, supra note 3, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, William Marshall explains:  
According to seminal case law interpreting the Speech Clause, freedom of 
expression promotes truth by fostering a “marketplace of ideas” which 
enables truth to ultimately prevail over falsity. The source of this theory is 
traditionally thought to be a famous passage from John Milton’s work 
Areopagitica. . . . The source of the truth rationale in First Amendment 
doctrine in turn may be found in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s classic 
dissent in Abrams v. United States . . . . 
Marshall, supra note 12, at 256-57 (footnotes omitted). These associations between 
Holmes, on the one hand, and Milton and Mill, on the other, can be somewhat 
misleading. For Milton and Mill offered a distinctly different version of the justification 
from truth than the one announced by Holmes. Specifically, the former emphasized the 
need for deliberation over a diversity of viewpoints whereas the latter two did not. See 
infra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Mill); see also infra Part III.B.1 
(discussing Milton).  
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English philosopher John Stuart Mill is helpful on this score.26 
Mill offered four arguments for why a diversity of ideas and 
viewpoints is essential for arriving at close, albeit provisional, 
approximations of the truth:  
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for 
aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our 
own infallibility. Second, though the silenced opinion be an error, it 
may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since 
the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never 
the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that 
the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. Third, 
even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; 
unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly 
contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the 
manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its 
rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the 
doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and 
deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma 
becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but 
cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and 
heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.27 
In proffering these arguments, Mill does not suggest that a 
diversity of views will necessarily lead to truth but that a 
paucity of them will almost surely doom us to half-truths and 
ignorance. 
While Holmes’s minimalist approach to the justification 
from truth is absent Mill’s insights, the emphasis on 
deliberation over a diversity of viewpoints does find root in a 
different version of the justification from truth, what I call the 
deliberative approach. This approach tries to use the law to 
foster and protect a diversity of viewpoints, and it expects 
people to deliberate about them to arrive at better conclusions 
about truth.  
While he is certainly not the only person in history to 
have advocated the deliberative approach, Justice Louis 
Brandeis, Holmes’s good friend and frequent interlocutor, is 
  
 26 The Supreme Court justices have sometimes explicitly invoked Mill as 
authority for their use of the justification from truth. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 900 (1994); Columbia 
Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 189 (1973) (Brennan J., 
dissenting); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969); New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272, 279 (1964); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514-15 
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 151 (1959) 
(Black, J., dissenting); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 241 (1951).  
 27 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 53-54 (Stefan 
Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1859).  
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one of the first on the Supreme Court to do so.28 Brandeis joined 
some of Holmes’s memorable First Amendment opinions and 
vice versa,29 but the former advanced a decidedly different 
justification from truth. Most importantly, while Holmes had 
advocated a marketplace of ideas where consumers act, and 
perhaps act impulsively, on their varied and subjective 
preferences, Brandeis envisions a world where free speech can 
theoretically enlighten civil society. The difference between 
Holmes and Brandeis is most evident in the latter’s 
concurrence in Whitney v. California.30 Brandeis wrote, “Those 
who won our independence believed that the final end of the 
state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that 
in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over 
the arbitrary.”31 Implicit here is the aspiration that people will 
bring to bear their deliberative faculties to adduce the truth. 
By contrast, Holmes had remarked in Abrams v. United States 
that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth 
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be 
carried out.”32 Missing in this formulation of the justification 
from truth is the insistence that people deliberate about an 
issue at any length.33 Read straightforwardly, the only thing 
that Holmes’s position requires is that the idea “get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market,” even if the idea 
commends its merits through little more than cheap emotional 
pleas and a busy swirl of sound bites. Furthermore, Holmes 
does not define what constitutes a properly functioning market 
or even that he requires the market to be functioning 
  
 28 For considerably earlier intimations of the deliberative approach in a 
religious setting, see John Milton’s work discussed infra Part III.B.1.  
 29 E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 30 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring), overruled 
in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 31 Id. at 375.  
 32 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 33 Cass Sunstein makes the following remarks about Holmes’s account of the 
justification from truth:  
Truth itself is defined by reference to what emerges through “free trade in 
ideas.” For Holmes, it seems to have no deeper status. The competition of the 
market is the governing conception of free speech. On his view, politics itself 
is a market, like any other. Holmes does not appear to place any special 
premium on political discussion.  
SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 25.  
12 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1  
properly.34 He thus fails to explain if the justification from 
truth can, for example, reduce the volume of speech by 
financially powerful groups that can drown out their 
competitors’ voices, or if the state may limit a parade of 
salacious gossip about celebrities’ lives in favor of more 
substantial information about the countless pressing issues in 
politics and social welfare.  
Unlike Holmes, Brandeis justifies free speech as a way 
to help people arrive not simply at any conclusion about truth, 
but at a more deliberative, more informed—and hence 
presumably better—conclusion. His attitude is encapsulated in 
these statements: “Men feared witches and burnt women. It is 
the function of speech to free men from the bondage of 
irrational fears.”35 Accordingly, Brandeis writes that “no danger 
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless 
the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it 
may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.”36 So 
too: “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood 
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the 
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”37 
The references to “full discussion” and “more speech” would 
seem to suggest the importance of a diversity of viewpoints in 
the search for truth whereby “the deliberative forces should 
prevail over the arbitrary.”38  
The landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan39 
captures the spirit of the deliberative approach. In that case, 
the Times had run an advertisement declaring that peaceful 
  
 34 Sunstein writes: “In all his writings on free speech, Holmes pays little 
attention to the appropriate conditions under which free trade in ideas will ensure 
truth, a gap that is probably attributable to his skepticism about whether truth, as an 
independent value, is at issue at all.” Id. 
 35 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376. For useful discussions of the Brandeis opinion, 
see generally Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The 
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988) and 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 351-56 (1993). Justice Frankfurter subsequently 
announced a similar observation:  
The history of civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of 
error which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have 
yielded to other truths. Therefore the liberty of man to search for truth ought 
not to be fettered, no matter what orthodoxies he may challenge.  
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1951).  
 36 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.  
 37 Id.  
 38 Id. at 375. 
 39  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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efforts at civil rights reform in Montgomery, Alabama and 
elsewhere were being met “by an unprecedented wave of terror 
by those who would deny and negate [the Constitution].”40 The 
advertisement did not mention who specifically was responsible 
for such terror, but one L. B. Sullivan, a city official responsible 
for the Montgomery police, argued that he was falsely depicted 
and sued the Times for libel. An Alabama jury awarded what 
was then an exorbitant sum for libel in the amount of 
$500,000.41 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.42 The United 
States Supreme Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court in 
one of its most important First Amendment decisions. Justice 
Brennan for the Court held that a public official like Sullivan 
was subject to an “actual malice” standard, whereby he could 
recover damages for libel only if he could show that the 
defendant had made a false statement regarding the public 
official acting within his official capacity and that the 
statement had been made “with knowledge that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”43 Merely 
publicizing some factual inaccuracy was thus insufficient to 
establish liability, and even doing so “negligently” (that is, 
below the standard of responsibility for a reasonable person) 
was not enough.44 While the Court thus made public officials 
remarkably vulnerable in the realm of public discourse, it did 
so in order to ensure that “public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open, and that [public discourse] may well 
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials.”45 The diversity of 
  
 40 Id. at 256.  
 41 Id.  
 42 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 52 (1962), rev’d, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964).  
 43 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. 
   44 Id. at 262. The Court clarified this aspect in St. Amant v. Thompson:  
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man 
would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in 
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing 
with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and 
demonstrates actual malice. 
390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).  
 45 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme 
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
18-20 (1965) (relating the argument that the First Amendment right of free speech is 
grounded in the people’s right of access to competing perspectives for purposes of 
deliberation about self-government).  
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viewpoints and ideas that the Court expected to be generated 
by the protectiveness of the New York Times rule would 
presumably help the audience arrive at better conclusions 
about the truth.  
A similar logic animates Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC.46 In Red Lion, a radio station had personally attacked a 
writer, calling him a liar and a communist.47 The writer sought 
a right of reply under the personal attack rule of the FCC’s 
Fairness Doctrine.48 In turn, the radio station argued that the 
right of reply violated the First Amendment because it 
impermissibly coerced the station to give air time to those 
whom the station had refused.49 Justice White for the Court 
upheld the personal attack rule because it was necessary for 
people in a democracy to hear different sides of an issue. He 
wrote that the 
people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and 
their collective right to have the medium function consistently with 
the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the 
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is 
paramount. . . . It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve 
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
  
 46 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Owen Fiss has commented on the connection between 
Sullivan and Red Lion:  
Sullivan sought to enhance the capacity of the press to report widely and 
fully on matters of public importance by shielding the press from a form of 
state action—libel judgments—that might otherwise discourage such 
reporting. The Fairness Doctrine [as construed by Red Lion] also sought to 
broaden the coverage of the press, to make certain that the all-powerful 
broadcast medium covered issues of public importance and gave listeners or 
viewers all sides of the story. In upholding that doctrine and the power of the 
FCC to regulate the press for the purpose of broadening public debate, Red 
Lion affirmed the very same values proclaimed by Sullivan. 
FISS, supra note 6, at 58.  
 47 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 371-72.  
 48 The rule states:  
When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public 
importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like 
personal qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a 
reasonable time and in no event later than 1 week after the attack, transmit 
to the person or group attacked (1) notification of the date, time and 
identification of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if 
a script or tape is not available) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable 
opportunity to respond over the licensee’s facilities. 
Id. at 373-74 (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(a) (1996)).  
 49 Id. at 386.  
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prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, 
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.50  
The dedication to maintaining a marketplace of ideas helps to 
justify the Court’s familiar prohibition against viewpoint 
discrimination and, to a lesser degree, content discrimination. 
To quote the Court, “above all else, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression 
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”51 The Court would therefore prohibit the government 
from permitting speakers to criticize the Republican Party but 
not the Democratic party, for this would amount to 
discrimination against a person’s political viewpoint. In fact, 
the Court would also probably prohibit the government from 
punishing any discussion of politics because the government 
would be punishing people for the content of their speech. As 
the Court explains, “Any restriction on expressive activity 
because of its content would completely undercut the ‘profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’”52  
But the justification from truth in its deliberative form 
is not exclusive to political speech. It also applies to commercial 
speech. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc.53 established the Court’s recognition 
that commercial speech deserves First Amendment protection. 
The case relies on the principle that consumers should have 
access to diverse information that will help them arrive at 
better conclusions about truth. Virginia’s legislature had 
passed a statute that restricted pharmacists from advertising 
or publishing, inter alia, the prices of the drugs that they sold.54 
A group of consumers challenged the statute as violating their 
First Amendment right to receive information about drug 
prices, especially given that drug prices in Virginia, “for both 
prescription and nonprescription items, strikingly vary from 
outlet to outlet even within the same locality.”55 Justice 
Blackmun for the Court struck down the statute as 
unconstitutional. He offered the following justification: 
  
 50 Id. at 390.  
 51 Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).  
 52 Id. at 96 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964)).  
 53 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  
 54 See VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974). 
 55 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 754.  
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As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of 
commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener 
by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate. . . . 
Those whom the suppression of prescription drug price information 
hits the hardest are the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged. A 
disproportionate amount of their income tends to be spent on 
prescription drugs; yet they are the least able to learn, by shopping 
from pharmacist to pharmacist, where their scarce dollars are best 
spent.56 
To this pressing interest by drug consumers, Blackmun added 
a more general reason:  
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may 
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is 
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what 
price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise 
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be 
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of 
public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent 
and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial 
information is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the proper 
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also 
indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that 
system ought to be regulated or altered.57 
Of course, the state may sometimes regulate commercial 
speech to ensure the safety of the consumers, but Blackmun 
explained that in this instance the statute was “highly 
paternalistic.”58 Here, he concluded, we should assume that the 
information “is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive 
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, 
and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of 
communication rather than to close them.”59 Phrased more 
directly in terms of the deliberative approach, Blackmun’s 
justification for protecting commercial speech presupposes that 
consumers are likely to make better decisions if they have 
access to competing advertisements.  
Blackmun’s opinion, like the opinions of the other 
justices that I examined, turns on cases in which the First 
Amendment’s right of free speech is front and center. But the 
justification in its deliberative form is present elsewhere, too, 
and a most conspicuous place is the Court’s college and 
  
 56 Id. at 763.  
 57 Id. at 765 (citations omitted). 
 58 Id. at 770.  
 59 Id. 
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university affirmative action cases. While the Supreme Court 
in these cases focused mostly on the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause rather than the First Amendment’s 
right of free speech, what deserves attention is that the Court’s 
support of affirmative action in this context is premised on 
creating conditions that will be favorable for the exchange and 
deliberation of diverse ideas and viewpoints.  
This thesis was first offered in Justice Powell’s plurality 
opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke.60 In that 
case, the University of California, Davis Medical School 
reserved a number of admissions seats for those candidates 
who belonged to certain racial groups.61 Justice Powell rejected 
this policy as violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.62 He subjected the quota policy to strict 
scrutiny because it contained a suspect classification in race.63 
Under strict scrutiny, the medical school was required to show 
that there existed a compelling government interest for its 
policy and that the policy’s means were necessary.64 After 
rejecting three of the four justifications presented by the 
medical school as failing to demonstrate a compelling 
government interest for the racial quota, Powell accepted as a 
compelling government interest the university’s goal of 
furthering a diversity of viewpoints on its campus. He wrote:  
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse 
student body. This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for 
an institution of higher education. Academic freedom, though not a 
specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as 
a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a 
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the 
selection of its student body.65 
Powell elaborated on this point:  
Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to 
select those students who will contribute the most to the “robust 
exchange of ideas,” petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional 
  
 60 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).  
 61 Id. at 289.  
 62 Id. at 309-10 (Powell, J., concurring).  
 63 “We have held that in ‘order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a 
State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and 
substantial, and that its use of the classification is “necessary . . . to the 
accomplishment” of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.’ ” Id. at 305 (quoting 
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (footnotes omitted)).  
 64 Id.  
 65 Id. at 311-12.  
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interest, that of the First Amendment. In this light, petitioner must 
be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount 
importance in the fulfillment of its mission.66 
To explain how this exchange of ideas might occur, Justice 
Powell quoted from an article by President William Bowen of 
Princeton University:  
[A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs through 
interactions among students of both sexes; of different races, 
religions, and backgrounds; who come from cities and rural areas, 
from various states and countries; who have a wide variety of 
interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are able, directly or 
indirectly, to learn from their differences and to stimulate one 
another to reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about 
themselves and their world. As a wise graduate of ours observed in 
commenting on this aspect of the educational process, “People do not 
learn very much when they are surrounded only by the likes of 
themselves.”67 
One finds in this passage a reiteration of the justification from 
truth. For the diversity of viewpoints helps students “to learn 
from their differences and to stimulate one another to 
reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about 
themselves and their world.”68  
In the subsequent cases of Grutter v. Bollinger69 and 
Gratz v. Bollinger,70 the Court reaffirmed Justice Powell’s signal 
  
 66 Id. at 313.  
 67 Id. at 312 (quoting William Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, 
Princeton Alumni Wkly., Sept. 26, 1977, at 9); see also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“The classroom is peculiarly 
the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through 
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a 
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’ ”). For 
a similar treatment, see the Court’s opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is 
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a 
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose 
any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities 
would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly 
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly 
is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted 
as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and 
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study 
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our 
civilization will stagnate and die. 
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).  
 68 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 n.48 (Powell, J., concurring).  
 69 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).  
 70 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003).  
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appreciation for the value of promoting a diversity of 
viewpoints in colleges and universities. Grutter involved a 
challenge to the admissions policy of the University of 
Michigan Law School, which took race into consideration, and 
Gratz involved a similar challenge to the admissions policy of 
Michigan’s College of Letters, Science, and the Arts, which also 
accepted racial minority status as a positive factor, albeit, to 
the Court’s chagrin, much more heavily than did the law 
school.71 While the Court upheld the law school’s policy and 
rejected the college’s policy, it endorsed in both cases Powell’s 
aspiration to create a diversity of viewpoints in colleges and 
universities. In Gratz, the Court rejected the admissions policy 
of the College of Letters, Science, and the Arts because, in the 
Court’s view, instead of trying to promote a diversity of 
viewpoints, it was an obvious attempt at social engineering by 
giving disproportionate advantages to members of certain 
racial groups.72 In Grutter, the Court stated that it “endorses 
Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a 
compelling state interest in the context of university 
admissions.”73 In fact, there was a sustained concurrence by 
Justice O’Connor that built upon Powell’s reasoning. She 
wrote:  
[T]he Law School defines its critical mass concept by reference to the 
substantial, important, and laudable educational benefits that 
diversity is designed to produce, including cross-racial understanding 
and the breaking down of racial stereotypes. The Law School’s claim 
is further bolstered by numerous expert studies and reports showing 
that such diversity promotes learning outcomes and better prepares 
students for an increasingly diverse work force, for society, and for 
the legal profession. Major American businesses have made clear 
that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can 
only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, 
  
 71 Id. at 253-54; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314-17. 
 72 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, explained: 
Even if student C’s “extraordinary artistic talent” rivaled that of Monet or 
Picasso, the applicant would receive, at most, five points under the LSA’s 
system. At the same time, every single underrepresented minority applicant, 
including students A and B, would automatically receive 20 points for 
submitting an application. . . . Instead of considering how the differing 
backgrounds, experiences, and characteristics of students A, B, and C might 
benefit the University, admissions counselors reviewing LSA applications 
would simply award both A and B 20 points because their applications 
indicate that they are African-American, and student C would receive up to 5 
points for his “extraordinary talent.” 
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273 (citation and footnote omitted).  
 73 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 307.  
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cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. High-ranking retired officers and 
civilian military leaders assert that a highly qualified, racially 
diverse officer corps is essential to national security. Moreover, 
because universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the 
training ground for a large number of the Nation’s leaders, the path 
to leadership must be visibly open to talented and qualified 
individuals of every race and ethnicity.74 
As the passage suggests, Grutter, along with most of the other 
cases that I have examined, stands for the proposition that a 
diversity of viewpoints and ideas is more likely than their 
paucity to lead to truth. The cases suggest, then, that the 
deliberative approach is more likely than the minimalist 
approach to help the audience arrive at better conclusions 
about the truth.  
But all of the cases that I have examined thus far 
concerned secular speech. The question remains: Is the 
deliberative approach a better alternative than the minimalist 
approach in helping people to make more justifiable 
conclusions about religious truth? I make the case that it is in 
Parts II and III. 
II. COMPARING SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS SPEECH  
Before I directly discuss whether a diversity of 
viewpoints and ideas concerning religion can lead to more 
justifiable conclusions about religious truth, I will first offer 
what I think are easier examples outside of religion. Using 
these easier examples, I will explain later what is potentially 
different about religion, and thus, what adjustments, if any, 
should be made in applying to religion the deliberative version 
of the justification from truth.  
The work of political scientist Scott Page is a good place 
to begin to think about how a diversity of viewpoints and ideas 
can help people to arrive at better conclusions about some 
truth.75 Page argues that we should imagine different 
viewpoints and ideas as “tools” by which we can arrive at better 
approximations about the truth.76 He suggests that we are 
more likely to arrive at accurate conclusions if we possess a 
  
 74 Id. at 308 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 75 See generally SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF 
DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007). 
 76 Page calls his argument the “diversity conjecture” and holds that “diversity 
leads to better outcomes.” Id. at 4.  
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diversity of mental tools with which we can examine an issue.77 
Among the tools are “diverse perspectives” that are “ways of 
representing situations and problems.”78 “Informally speaking, 
perspectives represent solutions to a problem. When we say 
that people have diverse perspectives, we mean that they see or 
envision the set of possibilities differently.”79  
As an example, Page uses directions to the venerable 
Zingerman’s Delicatessen in Ann Arbor, Michigan:  
Isabelle, an Ann Arbor resident, might represent a location relative 
to her home—“To get to Zingerman’s, go down State Street and take 
a left in front of the big Catholic Church.” Her brother, Nicky, might 
represent those same locations using a mental map of city streets—
“Zingerman’s sits on the corner of Kingsley and Detroit.” Given their 
perspectives, Nicky would prove far more capable of telling a visitor 
how to get from Zingerman’s to the Brown Jug, another Ann Arbor 
landmark.80  
We can embellish this example. Elise, a graphic artist, might 
believe that Zingerman’s is a little difficult to spot without a 
good illustration and so may draw the orange façade of the 
building that houses it. Or, Samson, who is blind, might tell 
you that when his roommate drives him there, Samson knows 
that he is getting close to Zingerman’s because about five 
hundred feet from the deli, the smooth asphalt suddenly 
changes to a bumpy brick road with a couple of small potholes. 
These examples are not meant to imply that one perspective is 
better than another, but to suggest that someone looking for 
directions to Zingerman’s is likely to find a diversity of 
perspectives to be more useful than just one.81 And notice how 
one perspective builds on another: Isabelle’s perspective would 
get you started on State Street and past the big Catholic 
Church; then Nicky’s would help you to locate Kingsley Street; 
then as you keep going on Kingsley, you notice that Samson 
was right and that the asphalt has changed to an uneven brick 
road; and then you notice near Detroit Street the only orange 
brick building. And there you are at Zingerman’s.  
  
 77 Id. at 9-11.  
 78 Id. at 7.  
 79 Id.  
 80 Id.  
 81 This is probably why Google and Yahoo print out driving directions that 
contain both maps and written directions. http://maps.google.com/maps and 
http://maps.yahoo.com/index.php (both last visited Feb. 23, 2007).  
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But different perspectives can help us with more than 
driving directions. They can help us with something as 
formalistic as math, too. Professor Page offers this example 
from an IQ test82:  
In each sequence, replace the X with the unique number that makes 
the sequence logically consistent.  
Sequence 1:  1    4    9    16    X    36 
Sequence 2:  1    2    3     5     X    13 
Sequence 3:  1    2    6     X    1,806 
The first sequence is a sequence of squares.83 “The square of 1 
equals 1, the square of 2 equals 4, and so on. The missing 
number is 25.”84 But the perspective in Sequence 1—the 
sequence of squares—cannot help us with Sequence 2. That 
requires a different perspective:  
The perspective that makes sense of this sequence is to recognize 
each number as the difference of the two that follow it. The first 
number equals the third number minus the second (1 = 3 – 2), the 
second number equals the fourth minus the third (2 = 5 – 3), and so 
on. It follows that the fifth should be such that it minus the fourth 
number, 5, equals the third number, 3. Therefore, the missing 
number is 8.85  
Sequence 3 is much harder than Sequences 1 and 2: How is it 
possible to go from the small numbers of 1, 2, and 6 and then 
jump suddenly to the large number of 1,806? Page responds, 
“We can find the answer by combining the perspectives 
developed to solve the first two sequences.”86 To wit:  
First, apply the perspective used in the second sequence: Look at the 
differences between numbers. The difference between the first two 
numbers equals 1 (2 – 1 = 1). The difference between the second two 
numbers is 4 (6 – 2 = 4). This suggests a pattern. That pattern is the 
perspective used to solve the first sequence: squares. Each number 
differs from the number after it by an amount equal to its square 1 = 
2 – 12, and 2 = 6 – 22. This idea seems cute, but it doesn’t seem as 
though it will get us to 1,806. And yet it does. Using this rule, the 
next number would be 42, 6 = 42 – 62, and the number after 42 
would be (guess what) 1,806: 42 = 1,806 – 422 (422 = 1,764). 
  
 82 PAGE, supra note 75, at 42.  
 83 Id.  
 84 Id.  
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. at 43.  
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Combining our two perspectives, we can make sense of the third 
sequence.87  
There are more examples of times when a diversity of 
perspectives helped people to better discern the truth. During 
World War II, Britain vexed over how to crack the Nazi’s secret 
code by which, among other things, German submarines were 
communicating with each other to track and destroy Ally 
supply ships.88 Realizing that a team of expert cryptographers 
was inadequate to solve the code, the British government 
sought to exploit what Page has called the diversity of 
perspectives.89 It assembled a motley group in Bletchley Park:  
Many of the people brought to Bletchley Park—Brits, Americans, 
Poles, Aussies—had training we might think appropriate for code 
breaking. These included mathematicians . . . , engineers, and 
cryptographers. But other people working in secrecy in the James 
Bond-like trappings of Room 40 and Hut 8 had been trained as 
language experts, moral philosophers, classicists, ancient historians, 
and even crossword puzzle experts.90  
The end result was that the diverse lot twice cracked the Nazi 
code.91  
In private industry, there is the example of 
InnoCentive.92 In 2001, Alpheus Bingham, the vice president of 
Eli Lilly, created a website called InnoCentive where large 
pharmaceutical companies could post problems for anyone, not 
just scientists who specialize in drugs, to solve for a monetary 
reward.93 “Solvers included dentists from the Far East and 
physicists from the Midwest.”94 By 2005, “more than eighty 
thousand solvers had registered[,]”95 hailing “from more than 
170 countries and span[ning] the scientific disciplines.”96 These 
nonexperts solved nearly one-third of the problems,97 an 
impressive number considering that their services were 
typically sought by “a company like Proctor and Gamble, which 
  
 87 Id.  
 88 Id. at 3.  
 89 Id.  
 90 Id.  
 91 Id. at 4.  
 92 Id. at 1.  
 93 Id.  
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. at 2.  
 96 Id.  
 97 Id.  
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has nine thousand people as its R&D staff and spend nearly 
two billion dollars a year on research and development.”98  
Similarly, the discovery of the structure of DNA was 
achieved by an unlikely team whose members held perspectives 
that differed sharply from each other’s and from those of others 
deemed experts in the field. Francis Crick and James Watson 
would eventually win the Nobel Prize for their discovery, but 
their intellectual backgrounds would not have suggested they 
would.99 For Crick’s training did not focus solely on biology but 
also on physics and chemistry; perhaps because of his diverse 
interests, he had never earned a Ph.D.100 Watson did have a 
Ph.D., but it was in zoology with an emphasis on the study of 
birds.101 These unorthodox backgrounds were not debilitating to 
their research and in fact “[h]istorians of science assign credit 
to . . . their diverse skills.”102 
Such stories of diverse perspectives are telling, but are 
the lessons gleaned from them useful for my topic of religious 
truth? I believe they are, but I should now explain their 
limitations and thus begin to outline how a diversity of 
viewpoints and ideas should be properly understood in the 
context of religious truth.  
All of the examples from Page that I have used involve 
people trying to solve puzzles which admit of answers that are 
formally logical, as in the mathematical sequence and the 
cracking of the Nazi code, or they are empirically testable, as in 
the InnoCentive website and the directions to Zingerman’s. But 
questions about a truth concerning religion are not generally 
amenable to formal logic or empiricism. This is so for at least 
two reasons. First, religion deals with questions of moral value, 
whereas all of the examples that I have borrowed from Page 
deal with questions of fact.103  
  
 98 PAGE, supra note 75, at 2. 
 99 Id. at 29.  
 100 Id.  
 101 Id.  
 102 Id.  
 103 The zoologist Stephen Jay Gould explains: 
I do not see how science and religion could be unified, or even synthesized, 
under any common scheme of explanation or analysis; but I also do not 
understand why the two enterprises should experience any conflict. Science 
tries to document the factual character of the natural world, and to develop 
theories that coordinate and explain these facts. Religion, on the other hand, 
operates in the equally important, but utterly different, realm of human 
purposes, meanings, and values—subjects that the factual domain of science 
might illuminate, but can never resolve. Similarly, while scientists must 
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Second, religion tends to rest on faith in the existence of 
a Higher Being or Beings whose very definition resists and 
transcends the properties of formal logic and empirical 
reality.104 So Charles Darwin wrote six months after his Origin 
of Species105 and after the death of his beloved daughter:  
There seems to me too much misery in the world . . . . On the other 
hand, I cannot anyhow be contented to view this wonderful universe, 
and especially the nature of man, and to conclude that everything is 
the result of brute force. I am inclined to look at everything as 
resulting from designed laws, with the details, whether good or bad, 
left to the working out of what we may call chance. Not that this 
notion at all satisfies me. I feel most deeply that the whole subject is 
  
operate with ethical principles, some specific to their practice, the validity of 
these principles can never be inferred from the factual discoveries of science.  
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, ROCKS OF AGES: SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE FULLNESS OF LIFE 
4-5 (1999). On the other end of the spectrum from Gould is the self-styled agnostic 
Keith Ward, an ordained minister of the Church of England as well as a theology 
professor at Oxford. Yet the latter’s remarks are largely consistent with the former’s:  
Modern science begins with the ejection of purpose, value and significance 
from the universe. This is one main reason why the “scientific worldview” 
fails to deal with all aspects of reality. The “disenchantment of nature,” the 
stripping away of all personal properties from the mechanisms of nature, was 
important to the birth of modern science.  
KEITH WARD, PASCAL’S FIRE: SCIENTIFIC FAITH AND RELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING 116 
(2006). 
 104 Here, it is worth considering the following examples in which religious 
founders have discovered God:  
The founders of all the great religious traditions are said to have experienced 
“knowing” in the form of revelations which guided or confirmed them in their 
mission. Moses talked with Jehovah, Christ heard the voice of God at his 
baptism, Mohammed was visited by the Angel Gabriel. Even the Buddha, 
whose enlightenment is reported as arising from his own Buddha nature 
rather than from heavenly grace, is described in the early Pali text, the 
Ariyapariyesana Sutta, as having overcome his reluctance to teach others the 
way to enlightenment—teachings which he considered lay beyond their 
understanding—only in response to the repeated appeals from Brahma, one 
of the supreme gods, who came down from heaven for this very purpose. 
Other, lesser figures, have also claimed knowledge conveyed through divine 
revelation, sometimes with consequences that have changed the whole course 
of human history as in the case of Joan of Arc’s voices and St. Paul’s 
experiences on the road to Damascus.  
DAVID FONTANA, PSYCHOLOGY, RELIGION, AND SPIRITUALITY 21 (2003). Keith Ward also 
observes that religions “can differ greatly from one another, but a central, if not 
absolutely universal, theme is the existence of a supernatural realm in relation to 
which some form of human fulfillment can be found.” KEITH WARD, THE CASE FOR 
RELIGION 21 (2004).  
 105 CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Julian Huxley ed., Signet 
Classics 2003) (1859).  
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too profound for the human intellect. A dog might as well speculate 
on the mind of Newton.106  
Thus, Darwin acknowledged the existence of a higher being 
beyond comprehension by the human mind.  
True, scientific theories like evolution do challenge 
biblical accounts of human origins and do possess empirically 
testable properties.107 Yet such theories, even if accurate, 
cannot logically begin to refute the existence of a Higher Being 
who has made such evolution possible.108 Moreover, some 
  
 106 Quoted in GOULD, supra note 103, at 35-36. So, too, the theologian Keith 
Ward also explains:  
What scientists deal with is the measurable, predictable and regular 
operation of objects, as such objects exercise their natural powers in 
interaction with other objects . . . . What science cannot do is prove that no 
other sorts of reality exist, or prove that physical objects only ever act in the 
predictable and regular ways with which science deals.  
There are, then, very real limits to science. This is not a matter of things 
science cannot yet do but might one day do. It is a matter of the limits science 
imposes upon itself, in confining itself to public observation, repeatability, 
law-like regularity and measurability. One extreme form of the scientific 
worldview is the belief that this is the only sort of knowledge there is and the 
only sort of reality there is. But that could not be a scientific statement, since 
it is meta-scientific, a statement about what science is and deals with. 
Perhaps there are other sorts of reality than the public and physical, and 
perhaps even the public and physical contains supra-scientific elements. Most 
religious views do take that alternative view. In doing so, they do not conflict 
with science. They conflict with reductive materialism, with the belief that 
nothing exists except matter.  
WARD, supra note 103, at 127.  
 107 See infra Part VI.C.2.  
 108 Pope John Paul II, for instance, believed that evolution and Catholicism 
were conceptually compatible. He wrote: “[M]y predecessor [Pope] Pius XII had already 
stated [in 1950] that there was no opposition between evolution and the doctrine of the 
faith about man and his vocation.” Quoted in GOULD, supra note 103, at 80-81. John 
Paul also declared:  
The Bible itself speaks to us of the origin of the universe and its make-up, not 
in order to provide us with a scientific treatise but in order to state the 
correct relationships of man with God and with the universe. Scared 
Scripture wishes simply to declare that the world was created by God, and in 
order to reach this truth it expresses itself in the terms of the cosmology in 
use at the time of the writer. The Sacred Book likewise wishes to tell men 
that the world was not created as the seat of the gods, as was taught by other 
cosmogonies and cosmologies, but was rather created for the service of man 
and the glory of God. Any other teaching about the origin and make-up of the 
universe is alien to the intentions of the Bible, which does not wish to teach 
how the heavens were made but how one goes to heaven. 
Pope John Paul II, Address to the Pontifical Academy of Science (Oct. 1981) quoted in 
Michael Ruse, Introduction to The Creationist Challenge, in BUT IS IT SCIENCE? THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION IN THE CREATION/EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY 225, 225 
(Michael Ruse ed., 1996) [hereinafter BUT IS IT SCIENCE?]. And, perhaps surprisingly, 
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religionists may refuse altogether to entertain the theory of 
evolution because they are adamantly confident that the 
epistemic resources of faith alone can answer questions about 
the meaning of human existence.109  
Religious truth, then, unlike the truths that were 
sought by Watson and Crick or the Bletchley Park code 
breakers, does not necessarily lend itself to the possibility of 
universal assent.110 While everyone knows that a given number 
is X in a mathematical sequence or that we have arrived at the 
orange brick building that is Zingerman’s, we have 
fundamental differences about whether we have found God or 
  
Charles Darwin also believed that evolution did not logically dislodge the existence of a 
god. The philosopher of science Michael Ruse, an authority on the evolution debate, has 
remarked:  
Given that religion provided such a barrier to evolutionism for everyone else, 
why should it have been no barrier to Darwin? Remember, this was a young 
man who [during his college years] had intended to be a parson, no less . . . . 
[U]ltimately Darwin did not see religion and evolution in conflict! Rather, at 
the time of becoming an evolutionist and indeed right through the period 
until after the writing of the Origin [of the Species], Darwin was quite happy 
to hold simultaneously to his scientific beliefs and to some rather lukewarm 
kind of belief in a creator.  
MICHAEL RUSE, DARWINISM DEFENDED: A GUIDE TO THE EVOLUTION CONTROVERSIES 
26-27 (1982) [hereinafter RUSE, DARWINISM DEFENDED]. More strongly, Ruse writes: 
“Can a Darwinian be a Christian? Absolutely! Is it always easy for a Darwinian to be a 
Christian? No, but whoever said that the worthwhile things in life are easy?” MICHAEL 
RUSE, CAN A DARWINIAN BE A CHRISTIAN? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND 
RELIGION 217 (2001). The psychologist Gordon Allport similarly believes that religion 
and the empirical demands of psychology need not be mutually exclusive:  
As every reader knows, modern empirical psychology initially separated itself 
sharply from religion. “Psychology without a soul” became its badge of 
distinction and of pride.  
. . . . 
At the same time there is inherent absurdity in supposing that psychology 
and religion, both dealing with the outward reaching of man’s mind, must be 
permanently and hopelessly at odds. As different as are science and art in 
their axioms and methods they have learned to co-operate in a thousand 
ways—in the production of finer dwellings, music, clothing, design. Why 
should not science and religion, likewise differing in axioms and method, yet 
co-operate in the production of an improved human character without which 
all other human gains are tragic loss?  
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS RELIGION: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
INTERPRETATION v-vi (1950).  
 109 See infra Part VI.C.2 (discussing “scientific creationism” and its logical 
defects). Stephen Jay Gould observes that such rejection of evolution constitutes “a 
marginal belief among all major Western religions these days, and a doctrine only well 
developed within the distinctively American context of Protestant church pluralism.” 
GOULD, supra note 103, at 130.  
 110 The term “universal” however will be qualified later. See infra notes 112-
125 and accompanying notes.  
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gods or His or Her or Its or Their Message or whether there is 
any message at all to be found.111 When we conceive a diversity 
of viewpoints and ideas in the context of religion, it is therefore 
important to realize that we should not realistically expect 
some collective “a-ha!” moment when all parties converge on an 
indisputable answer.  
Given this condition, the justification from truth would 
seem an inappropriate fit for religious expression, at least if we 
accept the characterization of the justification by some 
scholars. For the justification from truth, according to these 
scholars, must logically presuppose that there are “objective 
truths” which can theoretically admit of uniform agreement. 
Consider Professor Stanley Ingber’s account of the justification 
from truth, which he subsequently used to criticize the 
justification’s entire enterprise:  
In order to be discoverable, however, truth must be an objective 
rather than a subjective, chosen concept. Consequently, 
socioeconomic status, experience, psychological propensities, and 
societal roles should not influence an individual’s concept of truth. If 
such factors do influence a listener’s perception of truth, the 
inevitable differences in these perspectives caused by the vastly 
differing experiences among individuals make resolution of 
disagreement through simple discussion highly unlikely. And if the 
possibility of rational discourse and discovery is negated by these 
entrenched and irreconcilable perceptions of truth, the dominant 
“truth” discovered by the marketplace can result only from the 
triumph of power, rather than the triumph of reason.112 
These needlessly austere expectations for the justification from 
truth merit a response.  
Ingber assumes that the justification from truth 
promises to render truths devoid of “socioeconomic status, 
  
 111 The psychologist David Fontana has stated, “Beliefs and practices vary so 
much between the major traditions that any attempt at defining religion can never be 
wholly successful.” FONTANA, supra note 104, at 6. He continues, “Individual religions 
not only differ considerably from each other in their understanding both of God or the 
gods and of the soul . . . but also in a number of other important ways.” Id. at 7. Indeed, 
for Fontana, the differences among religions “are so extreme that we may again 
question whether all the traditions concerned should come under the one category of 
religion . . . .” Id. at 8. See generally KEITH WARD, GOD: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 
(2002) (discussing the differences in religious beliefs among various religions 
throughout Western history); OUR RELIGIONS (Arvind Sharma ed., 1993) (discussing 
the differences among Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam); HUSTON SMITH, THE WORLD’S RELIGIONS: OUR GREAT 
WISDOM TRADITIONS (1991) (discussing the differences in religious meaning among 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and the 
“primal religions”).  
 112 Ingber, supra note 3, at 15 (footnotes omitted).  
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experience, psychological propensities, and societal roles.” But 
this expectation, taken straightforwardly, is completely 
implausible on its face. For there is no such truth. Even in 
science, a field where one might anticipate only the cold 
objectivity of facts, we encounter resistance to a conception of 
truth that presumes the unassailability of its epistemology. 
Indeed, as Thomas Kuhn has remarked in his famous work on 
the history of science, the ostensibly objective truths that are 
the products of science are necessarily influenced by the 
contingencies of culture, experience, and personal 
idiosyncrasies.113 Accordingly, Kuhn is reluctant to ascribe 
“objective truth” to any particular scientific discovery. He offers 
the example of how Galileo’s description of motion differed from 
that of the Aristotelian physicist:  
Since remote antiquity most people have seen one or another heavy 
body swinging back and forth on a string or chain until it finally 
comes to rest. To the Aristotelians, who believed that a heavy body is 
moved by its own nature from a higher position to a state of natural 
rest at a lower one, the swinging body was simply falling with 
difficulty. Constrained by the chain, it could achieve rest at its low 
point only after a tortuous motion and a considerable time. Galileo, 
on the other hand, looking at the swinging body, saw a pendulum, a 
body that almost succeeded in repeating the same motion over and 
over again ad infinitum. And having seen that much, Galileo 
observed other properties of the pendulum as well and constructed 
many of the most significant and original parts of his new dynamics 
around them. From the properties of the pendulum, for example, 
Galileo derived his only full and sound arguments for the 
independence of weight and rate of fall, as well as for the 
relationship between vertical height and terminal velocity of motions 
down inclined planes. All these natural phenomena he saw 
differently from the way they had been seen before.114  
In explaining Galileo’s “discovery,” Kuhn points to those very 
contingencies in perspective that Ingber finds so troubling:  
Why did that shift of vision occur? Through Galileo’s individual 
genius, of course. But note that genius does not here manifest itself 
in more accurate or objective observation of the swinging body. 
Descriptively, the Aristotelian perception is just as accurate. When 
Galileo reported that the pendulum’s period was independent of 
amplitude for amplitudes as great as 90°, his view of the pendulum 
led him to see far more regularity than we can now discover there. 
Rather, what seems to have been involved was the exploitation by 
  
 113 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 
1996).  
 114 Id. at 118-19 (footnote omitted).  
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genius of perceptual possibilities made available by a medieval 
paradigm shift. Galileo was not raised completely as an Aristotelian. 
On the contrary, he was trained to analyze motions in terms of the 
impetus theory, a late medieval paradigm which held that the 
continuing motion of a heavy body is due to an internal power 
implanted in it by the projector that initiated its motion.115  
Galileo’s experience and training, as influenced by the 
contemporary views of his society, caused him to adopt a new 
scientific theory that replaced what had long been understood 
to be truth.  
Thus, even in science, a field that we conventionally 
associate with objective truths, there are disagreements 
engendered by what Ingber identified as “experience, 
psychological propensities, and societal roles.” The result is one 
that is disheartening for those who long for “objective truths” 
that are invulnerable to debate. Kuhn explains: 
To the extent, as significant as it is incomplete, that two scientific 
schools disagree about what is a problem and what a solution, they 
will inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative 
merits of their respective paradigms. In the partially circular 
arguments that regularly result, each paradigm will be shown to 
satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall 
short of a few of those dictated by its opponent.116  
What Kuhn suggests in the passage is that any given scientific 
discipline has already predetermined what sorts of “truth” it 
seeks to find simply by defining the tests and methods that will 
be employed. With this in mind, I need to revisit this statement 
by Professor Ingber: “And if the possibility of rational discourse 
and discovery is negated by these entrenched and 
irreconcilable perceptions of truth, the dominant ‘truth’ 
discovered by the marketplace can result only from the 
triumph of power, rather than the triumph of reason.”117 The 
logic of scientific discovery described by Kuhn suggests that 
“reason” does not (and cannot) exist outside the particular 
scientific theory or paradigm which constitutes it, and that 
there is no universal, overarching scientific theory that can 
settle their disputes as a matter of principle.118  
  
 115 Id. at 119 (footnote omitted).  
 116 Id. at 109-10.  
 117 Ingber, supra note 3, at 15 (footnote omitted).  
 118 Kuhn explains:  
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But surely we should not therefore condemn science as 
ineffectual in helping us to arrive at better conclusions about 
the truth. That is, we can sensibly argue that the justification 
from truth should underwrite the legal right to scientific 
discourse. Similarly, we should not condemn non-scientific 
speakers in the marketplace of ideas because they also lack an 
overarching objective truth waiting to be discovered. Recall the 
Court’s application of the justification from truth to race-based 
affirmative action in college admissions. Justice Powell, writing 
a plurality opinion in Bakke, quoted from President William 
Bowen of Princeton that the purpose of a college education is 
not necessarily to find some ultimate truth but to be exposed to 
the truths of others, which can challenge and enrich one’s 
understanding.119 There is no expectation that students will 
learn “objective” truths from engaging those who are different 
from them. What is hoped is that students will “learn from 
their differences” and “stimulate one another to reexamine 
even their most deeply held assumptions about themselves and 
their world.” It is quite unlikely that the students will, after 
meeting or living with those who are different, arrive at the 
same conclusions about cultural truths or arrive at conclusions 
that others will necessarily regard as admirable. The 
affirmative action policy, according to the Court, is meant 
simply to provide for conditions where students are encouraged 
to acquire information about others’ worldviews and to 
deliberate about them, especially in relation to their own.  
  
When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, 
their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue 
in that paradigm’s defense.  
The resulting circularity does not, of course, make the arguments wrong or 
even ineffectual. The man who premises a paradigm when arguing in its 
defense can nonetheless provide a clear exhibit of what scientific practice will 
be like for those who adopt the new view of nature. That exhibit can be 
immensely persuasive, often compellingly so. Yet, whatever its force, the 
status of the circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made 
logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into 
the circle. The premises and values shared by the two parties to a debate over 
paradigms are not sufficiently extensive for that. As in political revolutions, 
so in paradigm choice—there is no standard higher than the assent of the 
relevant community. 
KUHN, supra note 113, at 94.  
 119 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (quoting William Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, 
PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY. Sept. 26, 1977, at 9).  
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A similar understanding of the justification from truth 
informs other cases that I have discussed. In Whitney, Justice 
Brandeis protected the public’s right to speech that was 
subversive of the state, but he did not make it contingent on 
the public being able to arrive at the objectively correct 
conclusion that such speech was dangerous and 
unpersuasive.120 Instead, he protected it because he believed 
that deliberation by the public was a valuable end in itself. He 
stated, “Those who won our independence believed that the 
final end of the state was to make men free to develop their 
faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces 
should prevail over the arbitrary.”121 Justice Brennan in New 
York Times also did not stipulate that the public would 
necessarily arrive at the objectively correct conclusion about 
libel or politics or racism.122 All that he wanted was for the 
public to deliberate seriously over a diversity of competing 
viewpoints: “[P]ublic issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open, and . . . [public discourse] may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks 
on government and public officials.”123 Similarly, in Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun could not possibly 
be sure that the consumers would arrive at some unequivocal 
truth regarding whether brand name drugs were better than 
cheaper generic substitutes.124 But, again, the point was not to 
ensure that the public finds some objective truth but that they 
make informed decisions borne of deliberation over an array of 
competing advertisements. So Justice Blackmun explained, “It 
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the 
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the 
free flow of commercial information is indispensable.”125 All that 
the justification can be expected to do under such 
circumstances is to generate a diversity of viewpoints and ideas 
and to afford the audience the time and resources to deliberate 
about them in a meaningful fashion. “Truths” about politics, 
economic theory, and affirmative action are inherently 
  
 120 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444.  
 121 Id.  
 122 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  
 123 Id. at 270; see also William J. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the 
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1965).  
 124 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 765 (1976).  
 125 Id.  
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contestable, but this conclusion should not cause us to cease 
trying to argue about these things, as if, since there are no 
unequivocal truths, it is useless to even deliberate about them. 
Similarly for religion, we should explore competing and 
alternative arguments even though the possibility of arriving 
at a steady parade of objectively agreeable answers is quite 
unlikely.  
III.  THE MERITS OF A DIVERSITY OF VIEWPOINTS AND  
IDEAS CONCERNING RELIGION  
In urging the merits of a diversity of viewpoints and 
ideas concerning religion, I want to sketch my arguments, for 
reasons that I explain below, from the categories of religious 
conversion and biblical exegesis.  
A.  Skepticism and the Supernatural  
The subject of conversion brings to the fore the merits of 
how a diversity of viewpoints and ideas can help people to 
arrive at better conclusions about the truth. For conversion is 
the radical adoption of some new religious truth and the 
complete abandonment of some other conception of truth.126 Is 
such conversion more justified if based on deliberating over a 
  
 126 Lewis Rambo defines conversion as  
change from the absence of a faith system . . . to another, or from one 
orientation to another within a single faith system. It will mean a change of 
one’s personal orientation toward life, from the haphazards of superstition to 
the providence of a deity; from a reliance on rote and ritual to a deeper 
conviction of God’s presence; from belief in a threatening, punitive, 
judgmental deity to one that is loving, supportive, and desirous of the 
maximum good. [Conversion also means] a spiritual transformation of life, 
from seeing evil or illusion in everything connected with “this” world to 
seeing all creation as a manifestation of God’s power and beneficence; from 
denial of the self in this life in order to gain a holy thereafter; from seeking 
personal gratification to a determination that the rule of God is what fulfills 
human beings; from a life geared to one’s personal welfare above all else to a 
concern for shared and equal justice for all. [Conversion means too] a radical 
shifting of gears that can take the spiritually lackadaisical to a new level of 
intensive concern, commitment, and involvement.  
LEWIS R. RAMBO, UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS CONVERSION 2 (1993); see also Richard 
Travisano, Alternation and Conversion as Qualitatively Different Transformations, in 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY THROUGH SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 594, 594 (Gregory P. Stone & 
Harvey A. Farberman eds., 1970) (defining conversion as “a radical reorganization of 
identity, meaning, life”); Max Heirch, Change of Heart: A Test of Some Widely Held 
Theories about Religious Conversion, 83 AM. J. SOC. 653, 673-74 (Nov. 1977) (defining 
conversion as “the process of changing a sense of root reality” and “a conscious shift in 
one’s sense of grounding”).  
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diversity of viewpoints and ideas or is it more justified if based 
on dismissing those options? I want to argue for the former. In 
Part III.A.1, I examine the case of a young Japanese student 
and in Part III.A.2, that of the great Protestant leader Martin 
Luther, as examples of radical religious conversions in which 
the subject did not deliberate over a diversity of viewpoints. 
Without denying the validity of the divine intervention as 
recounted in these two conversion experiences, I suggest that a 
deliberative approach might have provided for them more 
justified conclusions. 
1.  From Divine Emperor to Holy Father 
The most famous instance of conversion in the Bible is 
that of Saul of Tarsus.127 Saul began as a relentless persecutor 
of Christians but later converted to Christianity. In the Bible, 
we are told that Saul never had to search for religious truth; it 
came searching for him. Here follows the relevant biblical 
passage:  
Meanwhile, Saul was still breathing out murderous threats against 
the Lord’s disciples. He went to the high priest and asked him for 
letters to the synagogues in Damascus, so that if he found any there 
who belonged to the Way, whether men or women, he might take 
them as prisoners to Jerusalem. As he neared Damascus on his 
journey, suddenly a light from heaven flashed around him. He fell to 
the ground and heard a voice say to him, “Saul, Saul, why do you 
persecute me?”  
 “Who are you, Lord?” Saul asked.  
 “I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting,” he replied. “Now get up 
and go into the city, and you will be told what you must do.”128  
When a light from heaven flashes around you and you 
find yourself having a literal conversation with God, you 
probably know that you are being treated to something special 
by way of religious truth.129 So it is no surprise that Saul 
converted instantly to Christianity.130 Later, Saul would 
  
 127 The Acts 9 (New International Version).  
 128 Id. at 1-6.  
 129 This type of experience, where a person suddenly converts to a faith 
because of some divine intervention, is sometimes called a “Damascus Road” 
conversion. John Lofland & Norman Skonovd, Conversion Motifs, 20 J. SCI. STUD. 
RELIGION 373, 377 (1981).  
 130 The Bible tells us:  
Saul spent several days with the disciples in Damascus. At once he began to 
preach in the synagogues that Jesus is the Son of God. All those who heard 
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consummate the conversion process by rejecting his identity as 
Saul of Tarsus (the enemy of Christ) and becoming Paul the 
Apostle (the servant of Christ).131 John Lofland and Norman 
Skonovd call this “mystical” conversion and, in their view, it 
“has in a sense functioned as the ideal of what conversion 
should be in the Western world.”132  
Yet ideal and practice are not the same thing: If you are 
like me—and I suspect that you probably are—you have not 
been blessed with dazzling heavenly lights and you have not 
found yourself having a conversation with God, where God 
talks back in coherent full sentences, gives traveling 
instructions, and tells you that he will get back to you later.133 
By saying this, I do not mean to offer myself as validation for 
the snide skepticism that has figured in what one prominent 
law professor has rebuked as the “culture of disbelief.”134 My 
statement is instead meant to suggest that our faiths are often 
mediated by books, sermons, culture, conversations (with other 
human beings, not God), and other ordinary earthly 
experiences. Therefore, unlike Paul, we will probably never be 
absolutely sure that we are in possession of some immaculate 
divine truth. This is why I believe that deliberation over 
diverse viewpoints and ideas is crucial, or at least very useful, 
for helping people to ascertain whether their religious beliefs 
are rooted in truth or whether they are principally the products 
of their culture, their parents, their psychological conditions, or 
some other non-religious source.  
Here, it is worth considering Mill’s observation about 
the provisional nature of beliefs. Many claims, Mill declares, 
have been subject to revision and rejection, and “other ages, 
countries, sects, churches, classes, and parties have thought, 
  
him were astonished and asked, “Isn’t he the man who raised havoc in 
Jerusalem among those who call on this name? And hasn’t he come here to 
take them as prisoners to the chief priests?” Yet Saul grew more and more 
powerful and baffled the Jews living in Damascus by proving that Jesus is 
the Christ. 
The Acts 9:19-22 (New International Version) (footnotes omitted).  
 131 RAMBO, supra note 126, at 145.  
 132 Lofland & Skonovd, supra note 129, at 377; see also RAMBO, supra note 
126, at 145 (“Many scholars consider Paul’s conversion to be the paradigm of the 
sudden conversion in Christianity.”).  
 133 Lewis Rambo writes after an extensive study of conversion that “[f]or most 
people, conversion is not so dramatic or intense [as for Saul].” RAMBO, supra note 126, 
at 145.  
 134 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 3 (1993).  
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and even now think, the exact reverse” of what Mill’s 
nineteenth century Englishmen accepted as the truth.135 Mill 
continues that “it never troubles [the ostensibly infallible] that 
mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is 
the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make 
him a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist 
or a Confucian in Pekin [sic].”136 According to this view, the 
claim of infallibility cannot be sustained given that much of our 
knowledge is the product of historical and cultural contingency. 
This is not to suggest that all answers are necessarily equally 
bad (or good), but that no one should consider personal views to 
be presumptively entitled to a claim of infallibility.  
Consider this example. There are no identifying names 
and no source is cited as reference in the passage that follows, 
but I think the example will suffice for my purposes. Walter 
Farrell, a Catholic priest, relates the story of a non-Christian 
Japanese man who came to realize soon after World War II 
that his belief in the divinity of the Japanese Emperor was 
false and that Christianity was the only religious truth:  
In a recent issue of one of our national magazines there is an 
interesting account of a young Japanese student’s experiences 
during World War II. He was in his second year at Tokyo University 
when war broke out and “swept along on the surging wave of 
patriotism, (he) enlisted in the Submarine Corps of the Japanese 
Imperial Navy.” . . . 
“At this time,” the young man writes, “I believed with all my heart in 
the divinity of the Emperor. To die for him was the supreme glory of 
the Japanese fighting man. To sacrifice one’s life in the Imperial 
service was undoubted assurance of an eternal reward.”137  
But the young man’s chance to die for the Emperor never 
arrived. Japan surrendered to the United States, and the 
young man surrendered to Christianity:  
A short time after we stood and listened to the Emperor declare over 
the radio in his own voice that he was not divine. This denial of his 
heavenly origin and attributes was almost more than I could bear. 
Lost in my thoughts, I wandered through the debris. My most 
frightening nightmares were nothing compared with the crushing 
loneliness and fear that I felt in my heart.  
  
 135 MILL, supra note 27, at 21.  
 136 Id. 
 137 Walter Farrell, Introduction to VINCENT V. HERR, RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY 
13-14 (1966).  
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I don’t know how long I wandered aimlessly through the streets. My 
first moment of awareness came when I heard the laughter of a 
group of children who were leaving the remains of a bombed-out 
building. The knowledge that anyone could laugh happily in such 
circumstances piqued my curiosity. After much hesitation, I 
approached the ruined building and entered.  
The first words I heard were, “Jesus Christ, true God and true man, 
loved us before we came to be, and died for each one of us that we 
may save our souls.”  
At the sight of Christ on the cross, my empty heart was filled and I 
was overwhelmed by what I now know to be the power of grace. In 
that moment of discovery, I felt the reality of Christ and His love.138 
The account here broadly parallels Paul’s conversion on the 
Damascus Road in that the Japanese student’s experience was 
also rather instantaneous and, hence, suggestive of the 
miraculous in its revelations.  
But there are differences, too. Whereas we are told that 
Paul was able to receive his religious truth through the 
unmediated voice of God and accompanied by a portentous 
spectacle of heavenly lights, the young Japanese man’s 
acquisition of truth might have been less straightforward. After 
all, the latter never heard the voice of God or saw heavenly 
lights. All that was offered to him was the laughter of children, 
another human being’s declaration that Christ was the Lord, 
and some kind of artistic representation of Jesus on the cross. 
None of these things, without considerable embellishment, is 
divine or supernatural.139 Therefore, how did the young man 
know that his sudden turn to Christianity was not a reaction to 
non-religious stimuli? As Lewis Rambo has suggested in his 
extensive study of conversion, motives for conversion “are not 
simple and single.”140 Instead, he explains:  
Context is the integration of both the superstructure and the 
infrastructure of conversion, and it includes social, cultural, 
religious, and personal dimensions. Contextual factors shape 
avenues of communication, the range of religious options available, 
and people’s mobility, flexibility, resources, and opportunities. These 
factors have a direct impact on who converts and how conversion 
  
 138 Id. at 14.  
 139 While a concept of religion need not require that a person experience 
something supernatural, the concept would seem to presuppose the existence of the 
supernatural at the core of any religion. See WARD, supra note 104, at 21 (“Religions 
can differ greatly from one another, but a central, if not absolutely universal, theme is 
the existence of a supernatural realm in relation to which some form of human 
fulfillment can be found.”).  
 140 RAMBO, supra note 126, at 140.  
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happens. People can often be induced, encouraged, prevented, or 
forced to either accept or reject conversion on the basis of factors 
external to the individual.141  
Let us examine these different factors, or to employ Professor 
Page’s terminology from Part II, perspectives, in the context of 
the Japanese student’s conversion.142 Is it possible that 
stunning political changes, rather than Jesus, may have caused 
the young man to believe that Christianity was the truth? 
There is at least a plausible case to be made. First, the young 
man’s conversion experience differs from that of Paul’s because 
the former never experienced anything like the supernatural 
intervention that caused the latter’s conversion. True, the 
catastrophe of war is no prosaic event, but it is not 
supernatural like heavenly lights and the voice of God. And 
then there is the matter of the Japanese student’s horrific 
realization that his Emperor was merely a political prop meant 
to reinforce an ideology of patriotism. The young man saw 
around him further evidence of Japan’s failures in the random 
debris and bombed-out buildings, testaments to American 
domination. Emperor worship had been literally discredited by 
a country whose emblematic religion is Christianity. It was an 
apt situation for Professor Rambo’s observation that “[d]uring a 
severe crisis, the deficiencies of a culture become obvious to 
many people, thus stimulating interest in new alternatives.”143 
And specifically, “the perceived strength of a colonial power is a 
crucial variable.”144 These circumstances raise questions about 
the young man’s conclusion that Christianity is the religious 
truth: Was it influenced unduly by the literal collapse of the 
Japanese nation and the perceived dominance of the United 
States? We do not know for sure, but it would seem desirable 
for the Japanese convert to have considered these other factors 
so that he may have arrived at a more accurate conclusion 
about his new found truth, just as it is desirable in the 
interests of finding religious truth that he have had access to a 
greater diversity of viewpoints before he accepted the belief 
that the Japanese Emperor was God incarnate.145 
  
 141 Id. at 20-21. 
 142 Rambo divides the factors into those that derive from “macrocontext” or 
“microcontext.” Id. at 20-22. For me, the categories seem too interdependent and 
porous, and I thus avoid introducing them.  
 143 Id. at 41.  
 144 Id.  
 145 One thing that comes to my mind with regard to the Japanese student’s 
conversion is religion’s power of consolation, especially after traumatic events like war. 
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There are other perspectives concerning religion that 
are external to religion itself but which can potentially help a 
person to assess the legitimacy of her prospective religious 
beliefs. For example, did the young man consider the 
perspective that his family, not his epiphany, is principally 
responsible for his religious disposition?146 The founder of 
psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, posits in his The Future of an 
Illusion that those individuals inclined toward religions like 
Christianity and Emperor-worship are less interested in the 
religion per se than in a desire for a strong father figure who 
can lay to rest the individual’s relentless anxiety about the 
uncertainty of life.147 Freud begins his argument in the 
following manner.148 He first describes man’s perception of 
nature as the antithesis of order and safety as represented by 
civilization.149 For nature in Freud’s view symbolizes a world 
where death is inevitable and the promise of an afterlife is 
altogether uncertain; it is also a world ruled by forms of 
suffering that are absent moral meaning and distributed 
arbitrarily.150 In their attempt to comprehend these powerful 
and mysterious forces, people seek the “humanization of 
  
The philosopher of science Richard Dawkins argues that this power causes many 
people to believe illogically that God in fact exists. He writes: 
It is time to face up to the important role that God plays in consoling us; and 
the humanitarian challenge, if he does not exist, to put something in his 
place. Many people who concede that God probably doesn’t exist, and that he 
is not necessary for morality, still come back with what they often regard as a 
trump card: the alleged psychological or emotional need for a god.  
. . . . 
The first thing to say in response to this is something that should need no 
saying. Religion’s power to console doesn’t make it true. Even if we make a 
huge concession; even if it were conclusively demonstrated that belief in 
God’s existence is completely essential to human psychological and emotional 
well-being; even if all atheists were despairing neurotics driven to suicide by 
relentless cosmic angst—none of this would contribute the tiniest jot or tittle 
of evidence that religious belief is true. It might be evidence in favour of the 
desirability of convincing yourself that God exists, even if he doesn’t.  
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION 352 (2006).  
 146 The Yale psychologist Joel Allison has suggested that “sudden and 
dramatic conversion” within a male divinity student might be attributable to the 
student’s desire to substitute a weak father for a divine one that can offer firm 
judgment and guidance. Joel Allison, Religious Conversion: Regression and Progression 
in an Adolescent Experience, 8 J. SCI. STUD. RELIGION 23, 24, 28, 30, 32 (1969).  
 147 SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION (James Strachey ed., W.D. 
Robson-Scott trans., Anchor Books 1964). 
 148 Id. at 22. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 20-21.  
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nature.”151 As helpless children, Freud argues, people identify 
their fathers as the embodiment of nature in its scariest forms; 
at the same time, the father comes to represent a protection 
against the unknown.152 This same anthropomorphism was 
evident in a person’s understanding of God. Freud elaborates 
this view:  
In the function [of protection] the mother is soon replaced by the 
stronger father, who retains that position for the rest of childhood. 
But the child’s attitude to its father is colored by a peculiar 
ambivalence. The father himself constitutes a danger for the child, 
perhaps because of its earlier relation to its mother. Thus it fears 
him no less than it longs for him and admires him. The indications of 
this ambivalence in the attitude to the father are deeply imprinted 
in every religion . . . . When the growing individual finds that he is 
destined to remain a child forever, that he can never do without 
protection against strange superior powers, he lends those powers 
the features of belonging to the figure of his father; he creates for 
himself the gods whom he dreads, whom he seeks to propitiate, and 
whom he nevertheless entrusts with his own protection. Thus his 
longing for a father is a motive identical with his need for protection 
against the consequences of his human weakness. The defense 
against childish helplessness is what lends its characteristic features 
to the adult’s reaction to the helplessness which he has to 
  
 151 FREUD, supra note 147, at 22.  
 152 Freud explained: 
Impersonal forces and destinies cannot be approached; they remain eternally 
remote. But if the elements have passions that rage as they do in our own 
souls, if death itself is not something spontaneous but the violent act of an 
evil Will, if everywhere in nature there are Beings around us of a kind that 
we know in our own society, then we can breathe freely, can feel at home in 
the uncanny and can deal by psychical means with our senseless anxiety. We 
are still defenseless, perhaps, but we are no longer helplessly paralyzed; we 
can at least react. Perhaps, indeed, we are not even defenseless. We can 
apply the same methods against these violent supermen outside that we 
employ in our own society; we can try to adjure them, to appease them, to 
bribe them, and, by so influencing them, we may rob them of a part of their 
power. A replacement like this of natural science by psychology not only 
provides immediate relief, but also points the way to a further mastering of 
the situation.  
For this situation is nothing new. It has an infantile prototype, of which it is 
in fact only the continuation. For once before one has found oneself in a 
similar state of helplessness: as a small child, in relation to one’s parents. 
One had reason to fear them, and especially one’s father; and yet one was 
sure of his protection against the dangers one knew. Thus it was natural to 
assimilate the two situations . . . . [A] man makes the forces of nature not 
simply into persons with whom he can associate as he would with his 
equals—that would not do justice to the overpowering impression which 
those forces make on him—but he gives them the character of a father.  
Id. at 24. 
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acknowledge—a reaction which is precisely the formation of 
religion . . . .153 
. . . .  
As we already know, the terrifying impression of helplessness in 
childhood aroused the need for protection—for protection through 
love—which was provided by the father; and the recognition that 
this helplessness lasts throughout life made it necessary to cling to 
the existence of a father, but this time a more powerful one. Thus the 
benevolent rule of a divine Providence allays our fear of the dangers 
of life; the establishment of a moral world-order ensures the 
fulfillment of the demands of justice, which have so often remained 
unfulfilled in human civilization; and the prolongation of earthly 
existence in a future life provides the local and temporal framework 
in which these wish-fulfillments shall take place. Answers to the 
riddles that tempt the curiosity of man, such as how the universe 
began or what the relation is between body and mind, are developed 
in conformity with the underlying assumptions of this system. It is 
an enormous relief to the individual psyche if the conflicts of its 
childhood arising from the father complex—conflicts which it has 
never wholly overcome—are removed from it and brought to a 
solution which is universally accepted.154 
In this way, God serves as a means to resolve an individual’s 
most intimate familial crises.  
Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect the young Japanese 
man in our example to have read Freud. But it would seem 
useful if the young man had considered something like the 
Freudian perspective, especially given the former’s unswerving 
dedication to the supreme patriarchal figure of his Japanese 
Emperor-God and then his equally unswerving and stunningly 
abrupt dedication to another supreme patriarchal figure, the 
Christian Holy Father. And if we may add perspectives, as 
Professor Page does in his examples involving mathematical 
sequences, is it possible that the perspective derived from the 
trauma of war compounded the perspective derived from one’s 
desire for an omnipotent father figure? Freud, after all, 
describes an existence that, without the psychological 
consolations of an invented divine father, would lead many to 
trudge along in lives that failed to offer redemptive meaning 
for their endless sufferings. According to the Freudian account, 
the Japanese Emperor Father gave the young man a purpose 
for and meaning to his military sacrifice during the severe 
uncertainties of war, while the Christian Holy Father supplied 
  
 153 Id. at 35.  
 154 Id. at 47-48.  
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a purpose for and meaning to the devastation and terror that 
he had experienced at the hands of the Americans.  
The absolute obedience that the young man exercised 
toward these two divinely powerful patriarchal figures would 
seem to recall the intriguing remarks of Freud’s fellow 
psychoanalyst Erich Fromm. Whereas Freud’s Future of an 
Illusion did not deal explicitly with political issues, Fromm’s 
Psychoanalysis and Religion does.155 Fromm invokes a political 
reference to the Fuhrer-worshipping fascism of World War II 
Germany, an example that should call to mind the Emperor-
worshipping fascism that organized the nation of the young 
Japanese man. Fromm explains that, like fascism, 
“authoritarian religions” require that the individual surrender 
power to some “transcending man.”156 In surrendering, a person 
relinquishes his independence and integrity as an individual 
but acquires a sense of being protected by some supernatural 
power of which he has, in a sense, become a part.157 
Authoritarian religion is thus not unlike authoritarian political 
regimes such as the one commanded by the fascist Emperor to 
whom our Japanese student had initially pledged his utter 
obedience: “Here the Fuhrer or the beloved ‘Father of His 
People’ or the State or the Race or the Socialist Fatherland 
becomes the object of worship; the life of the individual 
becomes insignificant and man’s worth consists in the very 
denial of his worth and strength.”158 
By saying this, Fromm does not mean in any way to 
condemn Christianity,159 but means rather to shed light on a 
particular kind of psychological disposition. Given the young 
Japanese student’s swift shift in obsession from one divine 
  
 155 See generally ERICH FROMM, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION (Yale Univ. 
Press 1950). 
 156 Id. at 35.  
 157 Id.  
 158 Id. at 36.  
 159 Unlike Freud, Fromm believes that religion could have ameliorative moral 
effects on both the individual and society. For example, Fromm praises the ethos of 
early Christianity:  
That early Christianity is humanistic and not authoritarian is evident from 
the spirit and text of all Jesus’ teachings. Jesus’ precept that “the kingdom of 
God is within you” is the simple and clear expression of nonauthoritarian 
thinking. But only a few hundred years later, after Christianity had ceased to 
be the religion of the poor and humble peasants, artisans, and slaves . . . and 
had become the religion of those ruling the Roman Empire, the authoritarian 
trend in Christianity became dominant. 
Id. at 48.  
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father figure to another, it would have been useful for him, in 
the interests of truth, if the young man had deliberated about 
Freud’s and Fromm’s psychological perspectives, as there is no 
indication in the quoted passage that he did.160  
2. From Repressive Father to Holy Father  
Even the conversion experiences of the most famous of 
religious figures can be described in psychoanalytic terms in a 
way that questions whether they have found religious truth. 
Erik Erikson’s classic study of Martin Luther is a good 
example.161 Luther would eventually become the founder of 
Lutheran Protestantism, but as a young man he had resigned 
himself to the insistent expectations of his coal miner father, 
Hans, who longed for his talented son to gain entrance into the 
profitable and respectable world of lawyers and their 
professional class.162 But something would change all that. One 
night, so the official story goes, a “bolt of lightning struck the 
ground near him, perhaps threw him to the ground, and caused 
him to be seized by a severe, some say convulsive, state of 
terror.”163 Luther felt as if he was “completely walled in by the 
painful fear of a sudden death” and before he knew it, “he had 
called out, ‘Help me, St. Anne . . . . I want to become a monk.’”164 
And so he did: “On his return . . . he told his friends that he felt 
committed to enter a monastery. He did not inform his 
father.”165  
Luther’s rejection of his father’s authority was not quite 
complete, however, for the young man continued to live in 
dread of his father’s power and authority. Hans was a 
  
 160 In making these suggestions, I do not mean to suggest that religious beliefs 
necessarily harbor some psychological malady. Instead, I am inclined to agree with the 
conclusions of psychologist Gordon Allport:  
Many personalities attain a religious view of life without suffering arrested 
development and without self-deception. Indeed it is by virtue of their 
religious outlook upon life—expanding as experience expands—that they are 
able to build and maintain a mature and well-integrated edifice of 
personality. The conclusions they reach and the sentiments they hold are 
various, as unique as is personality itself. 
ALLPORT, supra note 108, at viii.  
 161 See ERIK H. ERIKSON, YOUNG MAN LUTHER: A STUDY IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 
AND HISTORY (Norton 1958).  
 162 Id. at 50, 56.  
 163 Id. at 91.  
 164 Id. at 91-92.  
 165 Id. at 92. 
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vindictive and harsh father who routinely threatened and 
bullied his son Martin. Worse, Hans rationalized his abuse as 
the moral righteousness of an upright judge of character.166 
After a lifetime of intimidation, Martin believed that he could 
not resist his father without emasculating him; on the other 
hand, Martin did not believe that he could obey his father 
without emasculating himself.167 He was stuck in a terrible 
paradox.168  
Erikson proposes that Martin was able to resolve this 
dilemma by turning to what he perceived as a higher father—a 
Holy Father—to whom the young man had to submit as a 
matter of authority. The evidence on offer begins with the 
recognition that Martin’s conversion, like that of the Japanese 
student, was impelled by a set of nonsupernatural events, not 
the divine intervention that defined Paul’s experience on the 
Damascus Road. First, Christ himself had spoken to Paul and 
others had witnessed it.169 But Martin never had any witnesses 
and he never claimed to have seen or heard anything 
supernatural.170 Professor Erikson writes,  
We must say, therefore, that while Paul’s experience must remain in 
the twilight of biblical psychology, Martin can claim for his 
conversion only ordinary psychology attributes, except for his 
professed conviction that it was God who had directed an otherwise 
ordinary thunderstorm straight toward him.171 
Notwithstanding these pedestrian renderings of 
Luther’s religious experience, the storm and the lightning, from 
a psychoanalytic perspective, were useful symbolic resources to 
resolve the problems with his father:  
There remains one motive which God and Martin shared at this 
time: the need for God to match Hans, within Martin, so that Martin 
would be able to disobey Hans and shift the whole matter of 
obedience and disavowal to a higher, and historically significant, 
plane. It was necessary that an experience occur which would 
convincingly qualify as being both exterior and superior, so that 
  
 166 ERIKSON, supra note 161, at 92. 
 167 Id. at 67.  
 168 Id.  
 169 Id. at 93. 
 170 Id. at 92. 
 171 Id. at 94. Erikson qualifies that he does not mean to reduce Martin’s beliefs 
to mere psychology: “We are not in the least emphasizing the purely psychological 
character of the matter in order to belittle it: Martin’s limited claims, coupled with a 
conviction which he carried to the bitter end, show him to be an honest member of a 
different era.” Id.  
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either Hans would feel compelled to let his son go (and that, 
remember, he never could and never would do) or that the son would 
be able to forswear the father and fatherhood. For the final vow 
would imply both that Martin was another Father’s servant, and 
that he would never become the father of Hans’ grandsons. 
Ordination would bestow on the son the ceremonial functions of a 
spiritual father, a guardian of souls and a guide to eternity, and 
relegate the natural father to a merely physical and legal status.172  
Again, as in my discussion of the Japanese student, I cannot 
say with certainty that Luther’s religious conversion is without 
justification. My aim is rather to invite consideration of an 
alternative perspective in psychoanalysis in order to enrich our 
deliberative possibilities for arriving at the truth of some 
religious belief.173  
In the next section, I sketch examples of people who 
deliberated about different religious perspectives in order to 
arrive at a more justifiable conclusion about truth.  
B.  Deliberation Over a Diversity of Viewpoints and Ideas 
I want to sketch in this section two perspectives on the 
uses of deliberation for purposes of discovering religious truth. 
One is by the Protestant philosopher John Milton in his 
Areopagitica, a pamphlet he wrote in 1644 to challenge 
Parliament’s censorship against certain religious books. What 
makes Milton’s argument intriguing for my purposes is that it 
is derived from a perspective that is itself religious. On the 
other hand, the second figure to whom I turn is Thomas 
Jefferson, a man whose skepticism about religion could never 
be confused with Milton’s religious zeal. I discuss Jefferson’s 
letter to his nephew in which the former president outlines his 
arguments for the sort of deliberation that I am commending. 
By offering the arguments of the faithful Milton and the 
skeptical Jefferson, it is my hope that the reader will gain a 
fuller sense of the merits of deliberation for the discovery of 
truths pertaining to religion.  
  
 172 Id. at 94-95. For a similar conclusion regarding the conversion experiences 
of some contemporary theology students, see Allison, supra note 146.  
 173 I do not, therefore, agree with Freud’s adamant declaration that it would 
be an illusion “to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere.” 
FREUD, supra note 147, at 92. I am inclined to sympathize with Erikson’s more modest 
understanding of the relationship between psychoanalysis and religion. ERIKSON, 
supra note 161, at 21 (arguing that psychoanalysis and religion pursue different 
objectives and that neither one need not logically take priority over the other).  
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1. A Perspective of the Faithful: The Case of  
John Milton 
I began this Article with a discussion of Justices Holmes 
and Brandeis as the forerunners of the justification from truth 
within the American judicial context. Yet while both justices 
restricted their discussion to secular speech, the most famous 
argument in Western culture for what contemporaries style the 
justification from truth was offered by the deeply religious 
John Milton, who sought to employ the justification to support 
religious, not secular, speech.174 Furthermore, unlike Holmes 
and Brandeis, Milton’s version of the justification from truth is 
underwritten almost entirely by religious arguments.175 
Professor Vincent Blasi has therefore wisely cautioned 
contemporaries against conscripting Areopagitica, Milton’s 
famous defense of religious speech, as a straightforward 
defense of expression generally.176 Consider what is surely the 
most widely cited quotation from Areopagitica. Milton declares 
with an optimism seemingly bordering on the naïve: “Let 
[Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the 
worse, in a free and open encounter.”177 As anyone today knows, 
however, there is no guarantee that truth will win in a battle 
with falsehood. Therefore, to make serviceable Milton’s oft-
quoted line, it is useful to consult the context. Milton is 
confident that truth will prevail over falsehood because God is 
on the side of truth. Milton’s declaration is less a prediction 
about psychology than a faith in divine providence. He “knows” 
that truth will prevail because God wills that it should.178  
  
 174 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 6 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1918) (1644).  
 175 See Vincent Blasi, Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First 
Amendment, Ralph Gregory Elliot First Amendment Lecture (Mar. 1995), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Milton.pdf. 
 176 Id.; see also Francis Canavan, John Milton and Freedom of Expression, 7 
INTERPRETATION 50 (1978).  
 177 MILTON, supra note 174, at 58.  
 178 Milton writes: “For who knows not that Truth is strong next to the 
Almighty; she needs no policies, no stratagems, nor licencings to make her 
victorious . . . .” Id. at 59. He also elaborates: 
For when God shakes a Kingdome with strong and healthful commotions to a 
general reforming, ‘tis not untrue that many sectaries and false teachers are 
then busiest in seducing; but yet more true it is, that God then raises to his 
own work men of rare abilities, and more then common industry not only to 
look back and revise what hath bin taught heretofore, but to gain further and 
go on, some new enlightened steps in the discovery of truth. For such is the 
order of God’s enlightening his Church, to dispense and deal out by degrees 
his beam, so as our earthly eyes may best sustain it.  
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But if Milton is confident in the broad outlines of God’s 
plans, he nonetheless urges humans themselves to do their 
part and deliberate over religious truth. For “God uses not to 
captivate [a man] under a perpetual childhood of prescription, 
but trusts him with the gift of reason to be his own 
chooser . . . .”179 And being one’s own chooser involves having to 
choose in a world where good and evil are mutually 
constitutive.180 
In fact, according to Milton, man’s knowledge of good 
begins with his knowledge of evil. He explains that Adam ate 
the forbidden fruit and thus at once acquired knowledge of both 
good and evil, and it was only by knowing evil that he came to 
know good, and vice versa.181 Instead of dodging the spectacles 
of evil, then, a dutiful Christian must vigorously seek them out 
so as to refine his conception of that which is divine and good:  
He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and 
seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet 
prefer that which is truly better, he is the true wayfaring Christian. 
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and 
unbreathed, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not 
without dust and heat.182  
Here, Milton’s rhetoric of virtue, while situated squarely in 
religious discourse, resonates with the language of Justice 
Brandeis in Whitney, because both men identify as a threat to 
the discovery of truth a passive audience that is indifferent to 
the obligations of deliberation, whether those obligations derive 
  
Id. at 61-62. When necessary, I have for clarity’s sake silently modernized Milton’s 
spelling and grammar.  
 179 Id. at 19.  
 180 Milton writes:  
Good and evil we know in the field of this World grow up together almost 
inseparably; and the knowledge of good is so involved and interwoven with 
the knowledge of evil, and in so many cunning resemblances hardly to be 
discerned, that those confused seeds which were imposed on Psyche as an 
incessant labor to cull out, and sort asunder, were not intermixed. 
Id. at 19-20. 
 181 Milton explains:  
It was from out of the rind of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of good 
and evil as two twins cleaving together leapt forth into the World. And 
perhaps that is that doom which Adam of knowing good and evil, that is to 
say of knowing good by evil. As therefore the state of man now is; what 
wisdom can there be to choose, what continence to forbear without the 
knowledge of evil?  
Id. at 20. 
 182 Id. 
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from religion, as they did for Milton, or, in Brandeis’s case, 
from the civic requirements of democracy. And in the following 
passage, Milton sounds like the nineteenth century pragmatist 
Mill, who argued that even false ideas can help the audience to 
refine and confirm its assumption of truth:  
Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so 
necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of 
error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely, and with 
less danger scout into the regions of sin and falsity than by reading 
all manner of tracts, and hearing all manner of reason? And this is 
the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously read.183  
Notwithstanding (or, I suppose, because of) Milton’s 
staunch faith in Christianity, the above passage is impressive 
in its open-mindedness. It goes beyond his earlier argument 
that good is mutually constitutive of evil. Here, Milton 
broadens his purview of the acceptable by urging his readers to 
reflect on “all manner of tracts” and “all manner of reason” and 
to raid a “promiscuous” stock of books. In this way, as much as 
Milton abhorred what he perceived as the intolerance of the 
Catholics of his day,184 his disposition bears a resemblance to 
that of the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church provides 
another example of the benefit of the deliberative approach to 
religious truth: the use of the devil’s advocate. Consider once 
again Mill’s defense of a diversity of viewpoints and ideas. 
While generally considered to be the bastion of secular 
enlightenment, Mill’s On Liberty contains the telling example 
of the Catholic Church’s use of the devil’s advocate, an example 
that is all the more interesting because of Mill’s jaundiced 
reference to the Catholic Church as the “most intolerant of 
churches”:185  
The most intolerant of churches, the Roman Catholic Church, even 
at the canonization of a saint, admits, and listens patiently to, a 
“devil’s advocate.” The holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted 
  
 183 MILTON, supra note 174, at 21. 
 184 Despite his tolerance for religious diversity, Milton refused to tolerate 
Catholics for he felt that they refused to tolerate anyone else: “I mean not tolerated 
Popery, and open superstition, which as it extirpates all religions and civil 
supremacies, so itself should be extirpated, provided first that all charitable and 
compassionate means be used to win and regain the weak and the misled . . . .” Id. at 
60.  
 185 MILL, supra note 27, at 24.  
2007] DELIBERATING THE DIVINE 49 
to posthumous honours, until all that the devil could say against him 
is known and weighed.186  
This passage can be read for the proposition that even if a 
priest feels himself called by God to advocate a nominee for 
sainthood, both the priest-advocate and those priests in the 
audience can benefit from deliberation over different 
viewpoints. Indeed, the original name of the “devil’s advocate” 
was the “general promoter of the faith,” for it was the devil’s 
advocate who urged Catholics to carefully deliberate about 
whether a candidate for sainthood was worthy of their religious 
faith.187  
I have conscripted Milton’s ideas as well as the devil’s 
advocate of the Catholic Church to show that even religionists 
can benefit enormously from a deliberative approach to 
religious truth. In the next section, I offer an example from a 
secular perspective, that of Thomas Jefferson.  
  
 186 Id. 
 187 4 New Catholic Encyclopedia 705 (2d. ed. 2003).  
The Promoter of the Faith was entrusted with opposing the claims of the 
patrons of the cause and those of the “saint’s advocate,” thereby earning for 
himself the easily misunderstood title of “devil’s” advocate. In actual fact, he 
was rather the advocate of the Church, which must be extremely severe in 
the investigation directed to establish whether or not a baptized person is 
truly qualified to be beatified or canonized. Statistical data on such causes 
clearly show that several processes, apparently very promising at the 
beginning, had to be abandoned later because of difficulties, raised by the 
promoter of the faith, that could not be satisfactorily answered. In these 
cases, the critical and seemingly negative work of the promoter of the faith 
undoubtedly had a great positive value, inasmuch as it prevented the Church 
from pronouncing a certain and favorable judgment on the life and works of a 
person without possessing unquestionable proof. The function of the promoter 
of the faith proved itself most useful in the processes that were successfully 
concluded. Not only did he guarantee that the proceedings were conducted 
according to law, but the objections raised by him . . . compelled the patrons 
of the cause to perform an ever more profound and complete examination of 
the person in question.  
Id. at 705-06. Especially interesting is how the Catholic Church, like Milton, views 
deliberation as logically conducive to discovering the divine:  
Consequently, [the promoter of the faith’s] activity contributed to the effort of 
presenting the servant of God in his true image, so that the faith may come to 
know the Christian richness of his soul and look on him as a person selected 
by God for the Church and worthy of beatification and canonization. 
Id. at 706.  
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2. Skepticism Toward Religion: The Case of  
Thomas Jefferson 
A diversity of perspectives concerning the nature of 
religion can help people to arrive at more justifiable 
conclusions about religious truth. While he is generally 
remembered as the President of the United States, Thomas 
Jefferson was a thoughtful student of religion, and his 
arguments deserve to be considered because he illustrates how 
a diversity of viewpoints can be used to analyze the integrity of 
a faith from a perspective outside the religious canon. During 
his presidency, Jefferson was condemned by some religionists 
as a stubborn atheist,188 but he took religious faith quite 
seriously and insisted that people’s religious choices should be 
respected, especially if they were the product of careful 
deliberation over competing viewpoints, including competing 
viewpoints that were grounded in those modes of logic and 
deduction characteristic of secular enlightenment inquiry. A 
sustained explanation of his position is found in his letter to 
Peter Carr, his nephew. Jefferson writes to him:  
Your reason is now mature enough to examine this object [of 
religion]. In the first place, divest yourself of all bias in favor of 
novelty and singularity of opinion. Indulge them in any other subject 
rather than that of religion. It is too important, and the 
consequences of error may be too serious. On the other hand, shake 
off all the fears and servile prejudices, under which weak minds are 
servilely crouched. Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her 
tribunal every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the 
existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of 
the homage of reason, than that of blindfolded fear.189   
Striking in the passage is its employment of those tropes that 
structured Justice Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence: reason, 
fear and courage.190 Like Brandeis, Jefferson contrasts reason, 
which does not come naturally but must be propelled by 
courage, against prejudice, which is a byproduct of fear. 
Reason, as Jefferson conceives it, resembles Brandeis’s 
  
 188 So write Adrienne Koch and William Peden: “The financial bigwigs of New 
York and New England still feared and opposed [Jefferson]; nor had reactionary and 
orthodox churchmen completely abandoned their habit of tongue-lashing the ‘Atheist.’ ” 
Adrienne Koch & William Peden, Introduction to THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON xxxv (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., Random House 1993) 
(1944) [hereinafter THE LIFE].  
 189 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in id. at 399.  
 190 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927), overruled in part by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444; see also Blasi, supra note 35. 
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conception in that it is meant to evoke a posture of critical 
inquiry, not necessarily a deeper philosophical commitment 
that rejects religion or considers reason incompatible with 
religion. Indeed, the lens of reason could, according to 
Jefferson, theoretically steer its possessor to admit the 
existence of God.191  
We are afforded an example of the importance Jefferson 
placed on deliberation in his discussion of the book of Joshua in 
the Christian Bible. He admonishes Carr:  
But those facts in the Bible which contradict the laws of nature, 
must be examined with more care, and under a variety of faces. Here 
you must recur to the pretensions of the writer to inspiration from 
God. Examine upon what evidence his pretensions are founded, and 
whether that evidence is so strong, as that its falsehood would be 
more improbable than a change in the laws of nature, in the case he 
relates. For example, in the book of Joshua, we are told, the sun 
stood still several hours. Were we to read that fact in Livy or 
Tacitus, we should class it with their showers of blood, speaking of 
statues, beasts, etc. But it is said, that the writer of that book was 
inspired. Examine, therefore, candidly, what evidence there is of his 
having been inspired.192  
Although the trajectory of his discussion appears to discount 
the veracity of the biblical miracles, Jefferson ultimately 
remains agnostic, accepting his own advice to Carr to “divest 
yourself of all bias in favor of novelty and singularity of 
opinion.”193 So he tells Carr that the account of the sun standing 
still for several hours is “entitled to your inquiry, because 
millions believe it.”194 “On the other hand,” Jefferson qualifies,  
you are astronomer enough to know how contrary it is to the law of 
nature that a body revolving on its axis, as the earth does, should 
have stopped, should not, by that sudden stoppage, have prostrated 
animals, trees, buildings, and should after a certain time have 
  
 191 Jefferson writes:  
Do not be frightened from this inquiry by any fear of its consequences. If it 
ends in a belief that there is no God, you will find incitements to virtue in the 
comfort and pleasantness you feel in its exercise, and the love of others which 
it will procure you. If you find reason to believe there is a God, a 
consciousness that you are acting under his eye, and that he approves you, 
will be a vast additional incitement . . . . If that Jesus was also a God, you 
will be comforted by a belief of his aid and love. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in THE LIFE, supra note 
188, at 397, 400.  
 192 Id. at 399.  
 193 Id.  
 194 Id.  
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resumed its revolution, and that without a second general 
prostration.195  
Jefferson takes a similarly skeptical but non-preemptive 
approach of bringing to Carr’s attention the competing views 
regarding whether Jesus was actually the Son of God.196  
True, many people will reject this sort of counsel to 
deliberate, and I am sure that many people believe that we 
attain religious truths by way of things like the heavenly lights 
and the literal conversation with God that transformed Paul on 
the Damascus Road. But as one who has yet to be blessed with 
such extraordinary experiences, I find useful a measured 
skepticism, whether it be of the sort associated with Jefferson 
or Milton, toward the discovery of some truth regarding 
religion. 
With this observation, I devote my time in the 
subsequent sections to outlining the legal dimensions of 
extending the justification from truth to religious expression.  
IV.  IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION IN THE SUPREME COURT  
The Supreme Court in New York Times reasoned that 
the public’s right to a diversity of political speech was 
warranted partly by the formal assumptions of democracy. 
Similarly, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court 
reasoned that the public’s access to a diversity of commercial 
speech was warranted partly by the people’s desire for less 
expensive prescription drugs. If we are to extend the 
justification from truth and its attendant insistence on a 
diversity of views, we should clarify the ways in which religion, 
like democratic politics and consumer consumption, warrants 
application of the justification. It is my intent to show that 
religion, according to the Supreme Court, occupies or can 
  
 195 Id.  
 196 Jefferson advises Carr:  
You will next read the New Testament. It is the history of a personage called 
Jesus. Keep in your eye the opposite pretensions: 1, of those who say he was 
begotten by God, born of a virgin, suspended and reversed the laws of nature 
at will, and ascended bodily into heaven; and 2, of those who say he was a 
man of illegitimate birth, of a benevolent heart, enthusiastic mind, who set 
out without pretensions to divinity, ended in believing them, and was 
punished capitally for sedition, by being gibbeted, according to the Roman 
law, which punished the first commission of that offence by whipping, and 
the second by exile, or death in furea . . . . 
Id. at 399-400. 
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occupy a place in a person’s life that is theoretically at least as 
important as democratic politics or consumer consumption.  
In New York Times and Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy, the Supreme Court appears to believe that the 
audience is entitled to hear a diversity of viewpoints and ideas 
for speech that is either political or commercial because there is 
something worthy, even compelling, about being presumptively 
well-informed in the arena of democratic politics or commercial 
consumption. Yet if politics or commercial consumption 
represents a potentially important endeavor where a person 
can benefit from access to a diversity of viewpoints and ideas, 
so too does religion. For while democratic politics and 
commercial consumption are important, it is hard to justify 
why religion is somehow less important in people’s lives. The 
very idea of religion, after all, presupposes a set of beliefs about 
an individual’s deepest moral convictions, the meaning of her 
existence, the origins of her creation, and the possibility of 
afterlife.197 And this premise is shared by not just religionists or 
students of divinity. It finds support in a domain that is hardly 
an exemplum of religiosity—the legal canon of the Supreme 
Court. There, religion is defined as a source of one’s 
profoundest meditations about the meaning of life as well as 
the highest moral authority. Such characterization goes beyond 
suggesting that religion should be viewed as at least as 
important as politics or commercial consumption in a person’s 
life. It suggests also that religionists deserve a right of 
autonomy that is free from undue state regulation, and this 
autonomy in turn implies that people should be able to get 
access to religious expression, including a diverse array of 
expression, to make better approximations about some 
religious truth. 
Even as the Supreme Court has ruled against particular 
religious practices, it has consistently recognized the signal 
importance of religion as an abstract idea. Justice Frankfurter, 
  
 197 Professor Marshall offers apt statements:  
Religion is concerned centrally with the understanding of a transcendent 
reality that explains and defines human existence. Whether God exists, for 
example, is very much the question of what is transcendent truth. Similarly, 
even for those religions which do not use a godhead, the essential religious 
question of understanding one’s place in the universe is indivisible from the 
question of what is truth.  
Marshall, supra note 1, at 16. The psychologist Erich Fromm has also written that for 
all major religions “man’s obligation to search for the truth is an integral postulate.” 
FROMM, supra note 155, at 19.  
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although deciding against a claim for exemption by Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, nonetheless 
asserted, “Certainly the affirmative pursuit of one’s convictions 
about the ultimate mystery of the universe and man’s relation 
to it is placed beyond the reach of law. Government may not 
interfere with organized or individual expression of belief or 
disbelief.”198 More emphatically, Justice Jackson in overturning 
Frankfurter’s opinion announced in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette, “One’s right to . . . freedom of worship 
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no 
elections.”199 Yet the Court’s recognition of religion as a 
significant enterprise deserving of constitutional protection 
preceded the twentieth century opinions of Justices Jackson 
and Frankfurter. In an early example from the nineteenth 
century, even as he rejected the Mormon’s arguments, Justice 
Field for the Court stated in Davis v. Beason that the term 
“‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relations to his 
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his 
being and character, and of obedience to his will.”200  
United States v. Seeger201 encapsulates for the 
contemporary Supreme Court the concept of religion as 
addressing ultimate questions and as constitutive of a 
comprehensive worldview. The Seeger Court defined religion by 
way of statutory interpretation rather than the First 
Amendment, and thus we are not afforded a direct statement 
about religion’s constitutional meaning. However, the 
discussion in Seeger is still profitable because it represents the 
closest attempt by the Court at a sustained definition of 
religion. Daniel Seeger was convicted for refusing induction 
into the armed forces. His refusal was not straightforward, 
though. On the one hand, he sought under section 6(j) of the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act an exemption for 
those who “by reason of their religious training and belief are 
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any 
form . . . .”202 On the other hand, Seeger “preferred to leave the 
  
 198 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940), overruled by 
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  
 199 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.  
 200 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).  
 201 380 U.S. 163 (1965).  
 202 Id. at 164-66.  
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question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open.”203 While 
Seeger harbored a “skepticism or disbelief in the existence of 
God,” he did “not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything 
whatsoever.”204 Instead, his was a “belief in and devotion to 
goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in 
a purely ethical creed.”205 The Court was thus confronted with 
deciding whether the term “religious belief” in section 6(j) of 
the federal statute was capacious enough to accommodate 
Seeger’s views. Although this task necessitated statutory 
interpretation, it also permitted the Court an opportunity to 
make indirectly some telling remarks about the meaning of 
religion in the First Amendment.  
In interpreting the statute’s reference to “religious 
belief,” the Court spoke of the need to embrace “the ever-
broadening understanding of the modern religious community,” 
but one common thread among these religions, according to the 
Court, was an engagement with an ultimate being or some 
metaphysical truth from which derived the highest moral 
duties. Justice Clark for the Seeger Court quoted the dissenting 
opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. 
Macintosh.206 It was Hughes, Clark wrote, who “enunciated the 
rationale behind the long recognition of conscientious objection 
to participation in war accorded by Congress in our various 
conscription laws when he declared that ‘in the forum of 
conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has 
always been maintained.’”207 According to Clark, the 
Congressional statute at issue in Seeger “adopted almost intact 
the language of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. 
Macintosh,” which stated that the “essence of religion is belief 
in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising 
from any human relation.”208 With these premises in mind, 
Clark permitted under section 6(j) “all sincere religious beliefs 
  
 203 Id. at 166. 
 204 Id.  
 205 Id.  
 206 Id. at 169 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931)). 
 207 Id. at 169-70 (quoting Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 633).  
 208 Id. at 175 (quoting Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 633-34). So, too, Justice Clark 
believed that Congress “must have had in mind the admonitions of the Chief Justice 
when he said in the same opinion that even the word ‘God’ had myriad meanings for 
men of faith: ‘[P]utting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions of deity, freedom 
of conscience itself implies respect for an innate conviction of paramount duty.” Id. at 
175-76 (quoting Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 634). Seeger referred to religion as involving 
the “fundamental questions of man’s predicament in life, in death or in final judgment 
and retribution.” Id. at 174.  
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which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to 
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is 
ultimately dependent.”209 This is a striking claim, for I suspect 
that no one on the Court would say that participation in 
politics or commercial consumption makes all else 
“subordinate” or is that “upon which all else is ultimately 
dependent.”  
Also worth considering is the Court’s discussion of the 
theologian Paul Tillich. The Court quoted with approval the 
following passage from one of Tillich’s books:  
And if that word (God) has not much meaning for you, translate it, 
and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, or 
your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any 
reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything 
traditional that you have learned about God . . . .210  
In the passage, the definition of religion need not be restricted 
to a standard Western Christian model. But according to both 
Tillich and the Court it does have to speak to an individual’s 
greatest existential concerns: the “depths of your life, of the 
source of your being, or your ultimate concern, of what you take 
seriously without any reservation.” Again, we cannot similarly 
announce that, as a general matter, voting for a mayoral or 
even a presidential candidate or buying cheaper prescription 
drugs goes to the “depths of your life, of the source of your 
being, or your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously 
without any reservation.”  
The Supreme Court expanded its definition of religion in 
Welsh v. United States.211 Like Seeger, this case finds the Court 
having to grapple with the terms of section 6(j) of the Universal 
Military Training and Service Act. But unlike Seeger, who at 
least professed the possibility that he might be considered 
religious under section 6(j), Elliot Welsh flatly disclaimed any 
belief in God.212 His moral resistance to war was instead formed 
by “reading in the fields of history and sociology.”213 Yet the 
Court concluded that Welsh’s morals were sufficiently 
analogous to the statute’s definition of religion, partly because 
the Court of Appeals decided that Welsh’s beliefs were 
  
 209 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.  
 210 Id. at 187 (quoting PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 
(1948)).  
 211 398 U.S. 333 (1970).  
 212 Id. at 341.  
 213 Id.  
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analogous to “the strength of more traditional religious 
convictions . . . .”214 Again, what I wish to stress is how the 
Court views religion as an important and even paramount 
moral enterprise, for Welsh would not have been permitted an 
exception under section 6(j) had he merely asserted that he 
sincerely held moral beliefs against war that bore no structural 
correspondence to religion.215 In this way, the concept of 
conscientious objector status illustrates how religious 
expression under some circumstances appears to draw greater 
constitutional protection than secular speech alone. Given that 
according to the Supreme Court religion is analogous to and 
expressive of our deepest moral convictions, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the right of free exercise should be 
justified in part by the right of people to have access to 
religious expression.216  
V.  HOW THE RELIGION CLAUSES PROMOTE DELIBERATION  
If deliberation over a diversity of views is a potentially 
useful means to arrive at the truth about religion or a 
particular religion, does the Constitution afford the means by 
which people can so deliberate? I believe it does. Specifically, 
the two religion clauses, especially when read together, forbid 
the state from invading the privacy that one needs in order to 
weigh competing religious perspectives.217  
  
 214 Id. at 337.  
 215 Here, it is worth considering Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder where he distinguished the constitutional status of religious 
expression and secular speech:  
Although a determination of what is a “religious” belief or practice entitled to 
constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very 
concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own 
standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important 
interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective 
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the 
majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated 
himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. 
Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and 
such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.  
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (footnote omitted).  
 216 Or, stated differently, if commercials for five different brands of toothpaste 
can be justified by the Court in terms of informing the audience, surely we could say 
the same for religious expression.  
 217 Professor Marshall has made a complementary argument but he argues 
that the religion clauses forbid the state to monopolize a truth concerning religion. 
Marshall, supra note 12, at 255-60. I make the different argument that the clauses 
tend to promote a diversity of viewpoints. In this way, I am inclined to believe that he 
 
58 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1  
A.  The Free Exercise Clause 
In order to deliberate on a diversity of viewpoints 
concerning religion, one needs a legal space that is sufficiently 
free from state interference, whether that interference 
manifests itself as informal coercion or formal penalties. The 
Free Exercise Clause provides protection against such 
interference. For inherent in the Free Exercise Clause is a 
commitment to a liberty of conscience, which, “as understood at 
American law today, embraces the freedom of the person to 
choose or to change religious beliefs or practices without 
coercion or control by government and without facing 
discrimination or penalties for the religious choices once 
made.”218 This right of freedom of conscience has been protected 
on both an organizational and an individual level.  
On the organization level, the Supreme Court has 
protected the right of churches and religious corporate bodies 
to be shielded from states’ attempts to impose their views of 
religion. An early iteration of this commitment was announced 
by the Court in Watson v. Jones.219 In Watson, two rival 
Presbyterian factions in Kentucky disagreed about which 
should own a church.220 One faction argued that its teachings 
were most consistent with the church’s original intent.221 The 
Court refused to adjudicate the matter based on interpretations 
about religious doctrine.222 Its rationale read:  
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious 
belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious 
doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, 
and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The 
law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, 
the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary 
religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination 
of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of 
controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the 
ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, 
  
is making an argument that is conceptually similar to Holmes’s version of the 
justification from truth while I am making an argument that is closer to the logic of 
Brandeis’s version. For the distinction between the Holmes and Brandeis, see supra 
Part I.  
 218 JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 130 (2000); see also supra note 11 
(para. 2).  
 219 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
 220 Id. at 703. 
 221 Id. at 698. 
 222 Id. at 727-29. 
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congregations, and officers within the general association, is 
unquestioned.223   
While Watson concerned a mainstream group in the 
Presbyterians, United States v. Ballard showed a Supreme 
Court willing to extend the protection of religious free exercise 
to more exotic churches and thus signaled the Court’s 
recognition of the value of religious diversity.224 The leaders of a 
church in Ballard were charged with violating a federal statute 
that prohibited the use of the mail to conduct fraud.225 They 
were said to have misrepresented themselves by way of absurd 
and inconsistent promises. For example, Guy Ballard, the 
church leader, had called himself Saint Germain, Jesus, and 
George Washington.226 He also claimed to possess supernatural 
powers to heal those afflicted with “any diseases, injuries, or 
ailments.”227 In the face of these eccentric, if not absurd, claims, 
the Court nonetheless asserted that the Free Exercise Clause 
must protect even the strangest of religious beliefs. Justice 
Douglas remanded the case and stressed to the lower court the 
importance of protecting the freedom of religious belief, even 
those beliefs that may be “incomprehensible” to some.228  
The Court continued to protect the free exercise rights 
of religious organizations in other cases by protecting the 
rights of their members to deliberate about their spiritual 
issues. In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,229 the Court 
invalidated a New York statute that sought to prevent the 
Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow from appointing a bishop 
in New York who would take possession of a Russian Orthodox 
church in that state.230 The rather unusual legislative 
prohibition was the result of a conflict between Communist-
appointed Russian Orthodox leaders and some of their 
American counterparts who, contrary to tradition, no longer 
wanted to be under the former’s jurisdictional control.231 Trying 
to strike a blow for patriotism, New York passed legislation 
  
 223 Id. at 728-29.  
 224 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).  
 225 Id. at 79.  
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 80. 
 228 Id. at 86. 
 229 344 U.S. 94 (1952).  
 230 Id. at 107. 
 231 Id. at 95-108. 
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that sided with the American members of the church.232 Kedroff 
argued that the Free Exercise Clause forbade such legislation. 
Justice Reed stated for the Court that in this case there is “a 
transfer by statute of control over churches” which therefore 
“violates our rule of separation between church and state.”233 
The Court emphasized the “spirit of freedom for religious 
organizations, an independence from secular control or 
manipulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, free 
from state interference, matters of church government as well 
as those of faith and doctrine.”234  
The Court has also sought to protect the free exercise 
rights of individuals. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the first case 
in which the Court analyzed the right of religious exercise with 
respect to a state law, Justice Roberts wrote that the right of 
religious free exercise for individuals as such “forestalls 
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the 
practice of any form of worship” and that “[f]reedom of 
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization 
or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be 
restricted by law.”235 Similarly, three years later, Justice 
Jackson in Barnette extended protection to the religious 
practices of Jehovah’s Witnesses with the following words: “If 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is 
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe which shall be 
orthodox in . . . religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”236  
Some of the Court’s most prominent free exercise 
decisions involved individuals who sought exemptions from 
generally applicable laws in the area of unemployment 
benefits. Sherbert v. Verner237 was one of the first of such cases. 
After being fired for refusing to work on Saturday, her Sabbath 
Day, a Seventh Day Adventist was denied unemployment 
benefits by a state agency.238 Justice Brennan for the Court 
remanded the decision but left little doubt as to how he wanted 
the lower court to decide.239 According to Brennan, “to condition 
the availability of benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to 
  
 232 See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 97-99. 
 233 Id. at 110.  
 234 Id. at 116.  
 235 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  
 236 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  
 237 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
 238 Id. at 399-401.  
 239 Id. at 402.  
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violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively 
penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.”240 The 
Court rendered a philosophically consonant opinion in Thomas 
v. Review Board.241 Here, too, a person refused work because he 
saw it as violating his religious beliefs. After being discharged 
for his refusal to work building gun turrets for tanks, a 
Jehovah’s Witness, like Sherbert’s Seventh Day Adventist, was 
denied unemployment benefits by a state agency. Chief Justice 
Burger for the Court found the denial to be a violation of the 
Free Exercise Clause. Burger explained:  
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon 
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a 
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby 
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior 
and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the 
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is 
nonetheless substantial.242 
Thomas, like Sherbert, stands for the proposition that the state 
should not impose a monopoly of truth about religion by 
coercing people to violate their beliefs or impairing the 
deliberative processes that produce them.  
Yet if Thomas represented a high mark of contemporary 
judicial protection for free exercise, Employment Division v. 
Smith243 represented a decidedly low one. Oregon had a statute 
that prohibited “the knowing or intentional possession of a 
‘controlled substance’ unless the substance has been prescribed 
by a medical practitioner.”244 A member of the Native American 
Church, Alfred Smith ingested peyote, a controlled substance 
under the statute, as part of his religious practices.245 Smith’s 
employer found out and became angry, for Smith worked as a 
  
 240 Id. at 406. The Court reiterated this statement in Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Commission of Florida. 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987) (“Here, as in Sherbert and 
Thomas, the State may not force an employee ‘to choose between following the precepts 
of her religion and forfeiting benefits, . . . and abandoning one of the precepts of her 
religion in order to accept work.’ ”).  
 241 Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 
(1981).  
 242 Id. at 717-18.  
 243 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997) and recognized in part by Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 244 Id. at 874.  
 245 Id. 
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counselor at a drug rehabilitation center and his employer felt 
that the activity, while performed outside the workplace, was 
nonetheless incompatible with the duties of a drug counselor.246 
After being fired, Smith sought but was denied unemployment 
benefits from the state because he “had been discharged for 
work-related ‘misconduct.’”247 He sued the state unemployment 
agency for violating his right of free exercise. The case 
eventually made its way to the United States Supreme Court.  
Justice Scalia for the majority rejected Smith’s 
argument and offered what many regard as a surprisingly 
unsympathetic view of religious liberty. He began with the 
relatively uncontroversial statement that the justices “have 
never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him 
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting 
conduct that the State is free to regulate.”248 This banal 
pronouncement soon gave way to more elaborate and 
restrictive reasoning, a move foreshadowed by Scalia’s 
resurrection of Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Gobitis.249 
Scalia announced a controversial interpretation of the case law 
by declaring that the “only decisions in which we have held 
that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, 
generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have 
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free 
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections . . . .”250 He also rejected the argument that the 
protectiveness of the Sherbert test should govern this case.251 
  
 246 Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.  
 247 Id. at 874.  
 248 Id. at 878-79.  
 249 Scalia invoked the following language from Frankfurter’s opinion:  
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for 
religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law 
not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere 
possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a 
political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political 
responsibilities (footnote omitted).  
Id. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940), 
overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).  
 250 Id. at 881. The Court decided that Oregon’s prohibition on peyote was a 
generally applicable law that merited nothing higher than rational review, which it 
passed. Id. at 878-81.  
 251 Scalia wrote:  
Under the Sherbert test, governmental actions that substantially burden a 
religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. 
Applying that test we have, on three occasions, invalidated state 
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Through these two maneuvers, Scalia drew considerable 
criticism from other justices and legal scholars as well as from 
Congress.252 It is not my aim to evaluate these criticisms but 
rather to clarify and underscore how Scalia’s opinion, despite 
its reputation in some quarters as unresponsive to religionists 
who belong to minority faiths,253 nonetheless rejected the view 
that the state may compel affirmation of some truth about 
religion. For he wrote:  
The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to 
believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, 
the First Amendment obviously excludes all “governmental 
regulation of religious beliefs as such.” . . . The government may not 
compel affirmation of religious belief, . . . punish the expression of 
religious doctrines it believes to be false, . . . impose special 
disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status, . . . or 
lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious 
authority or dogma . . . .254  
While many religionists were dismayed by Scalia’s opinion, 
what remains clear is that Smith is dedicated in principle to 
the position that the state should permit people the space in 
which to deliberate about a diversity of beliefs.  
B.  The Establishment Clause  
Like the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment 
Clause also preserves a space in which the individual can, 
without undue state interference, deliberate about a diversity 
of views on religion. Explicating this position however is not a 
straightforward task, given that there is disagreement about 
  
unemployment compensation rules that conditioned the availability of 
benefits upon an applicant’s willingness to work under conditions forbidden 
by his religion. We have never invalidated any governmental action on the 
basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation. 
Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts 
other than that, we have always found the test satisfied. In recent years we 
have abstained from applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment 
compensation field) at all. 
Id. at 883 (citations omitted). 
 252 Congress, in an attempt to overturn Scalia’s opinion, passed the American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 
3125 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2000)).  
 253 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 134, at 128-29 (“The judgment against the 
Native American Church [in Smith], however, demonstrates that the political process 
will protect only the mainstream religions, not many smaller groups that exist at the 
margins.”).  
 254 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.  
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what is the proper test to adjudicate a violation of the 
Establishment Clause. I will not attempt to settle the debate, a 
job that would take me outside the aims of this Article. But I 
will argue that under all of the prominent judicial tests, the 
Court has made clear that the Establishment Clause prohibits 
the state from claiming a monopoly on religious truth. There 
are essentially three255 prominent judicial theories for 
underwriting the Establishment Clause256: strict separation, 
neutrality, and accommodation.  
The strict separation theory aspires to the maximum 
separation of church and state. Its most famous American 
expositor is Thomas Jefferson, who made clear his advocacy for 
the separation of church and state in his letter to the Danbury 
Baptist Association in 1802. There, he penned his famous 
metaphor of a “wall of a separation between church and state”:  
I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should “make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between 
church and State.257 
In the case law, Everson v. Board of Education258 represents the 
single most emphatic endorsement of this strict separation 
theory.259 While Justice Black wrote the majority opinion and 
Justice Rutledge the dissent, both subscribed to a version of 
strict separation that denied the state’s ability to monopolize 
religious truth. Black initially wrote: “The ‘establishment of 
religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church.”260 What followed was an illuminating commitment to 
protecting opportunities for people to deliberate about a 
diversity of views regarding religion. Black asserted that 
  
 255 While some scholars might argue that there are more, mostly for purposes 
of convenience, I will bypass some of the subtler differences. 
 256 Professor Witte has identified additional judicial theories for 
disestablishment: separationism, accomodationism, neutrality, endorsement, and equal 
treatment. WITTE, supra note 218, at 152-63. 
 257 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim 
Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in 
the State of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in THE LIFE, supra note 188, at 307, 307.  
 258 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  
 259 In Everson, the state permitted school boards to reimburse parents who 
sent their children to private schools, including Catholic schools, for the cost of 
transportation to and from the school. Id. at 16-18. 
 260 Id. at 15. 
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neither the state nor the federal government “can pass laws 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion 
over another.”261 By adopting this position of neutrality, one can 
read the Establishment Clause as affording equal opportunities 
for all religionists to deliberate about their faiths. Black’s 
commitment to neutrality animated his other statements:  
[Neither state nor federal government] can force nor influence a 
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or 
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person 
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any 
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever 
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor 
the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the 
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.262  
Although dissenting in the same case that contains this 
passage, Justice Rutledge was no less committed to the 
abstract proposition of strict separation, and, accordingly, his 
justifications can also be interpreted as supporting protection 
for the deliberation of diverse faiths.263 He wrote:   
The Amendment’s purpose was not to strike merely at the official 
establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a 
formal relation such as had prevailed in England and some of the 
colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all such relationships. But the 
object was broader than separating church and state in this narrow 
sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the 
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively 
forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.264 
This staunch commitment to separation of church and state 
characterized the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
from Everson to the 1980s.265  
What has come to partly replace the strict separation 
approach is the neutrality approach. The neutrality approach 
  
 261 Id. at 15-16. For similar views, see, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 
97, 103-04 (1968) (“Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral 
in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.”).  
 262 Id. at 15.  
 263 Of course, “the very fact that Justices who agreed on the governing 
principle could divide so sharply on the result suggests that the principle evoked by the 
image of a wall furnishes less guidance than metaphor.” TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1166.  
 264 Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32.  
 265 Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
230, 233-34 (1994) (Strict separation “became the ‘official’ history of the 
[establishment] clause until challenged by scholars and Justices in the early 1980s.”). 
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to the Establishment Clause seeks to ensure that the state 
neither advances one religion over another nor advances 
religion over secularism or secularism over religion. In the 
Supreme Court, this approach has taken the form of an 
endorsement test, and Justice O’Connor assumed the role of 
one of its main articulators. In Lynch v. Donnelly, she began 
her concurring opinion with the announcement that the 
“Establishment Clause prohibits government from making 
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s 
standing in the political community.”266 She further explained:   
Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways. 
One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which 
may interfere with the independence of the institutions, give the 
institutions access to government or governmental powers not fully 
shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster the creation of 
political constituencies defined along religious lines . . . . The second 
and more direct infringement is government endorsement or 
disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. 
Disapproval sends the opposite message.267 
What chiefly distinguishes the endorsement test from the strict 
separation test, then, is the former’s commitment to social 
inclusion and equal citizenship.268 Here too, however, the 
endorsement test, like the strict separation test, can be 
interpreted as an attempt to protect spaces for religionists to 
deliberate about a diversity of views. For no matter the view, 
the state is prohibited from stigmatizing, and thus coercing, 
people on the basis of what they choose to deliberate.  
The accommodation approach, compared to the 
neutrality approach, is less protective of the religionist; for 
while the latter requires the religionist to show that the law 
makes her feel unwelcome, the former requires the religionist 
to show that the law goes further by coercing her to conform 
her beliefs to those privileged by the state. Lee v. Weisman269 is 
a prime example of this approach. In that case, the principal of 
a public middle school invited a rabbi to deliver a 
  
 266 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
 267 Id. at 687-88 (citation omitted). 
 268 For a complementary perspective, see KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO 
AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989).  
 269 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  
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nondenominational prayer at the graduation ceremony.270 The 
prayer was prepared by the National Conference of Christians 
and Jews and was meant to be governed by a spirit of 
“inclusiveness and sensitivity.”271 Justice Kennedy for the Court 
found the prayer to violate the Establishment Clause because 
it had the tendency to coerce students who did not wish to 
participate in the prayer.272 According to Kennedy, “It is beyond 
dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in 
religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 
‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do 
  
 270 Id. at 581.  
 271 Id. There were two prayers, an Invocation and a Benediction. The 
Invocation read:  
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:  
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of 
minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women 
grow up to enrich it.  
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up 
to guard it.  
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, 
for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You. May those we 
honor this morning always turn to it in trust.  
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan 
Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it.  
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our 
hope for the future, be richly fulfilled.  
Amen. 
The Benediction read:  
O God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for 
learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.  
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important 
milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who 
helped prepare them.  
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to 
understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We 
must each strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love 
mercy, to walk humbly.  
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing 
us to reach this special, happy occasion.  
Amen. 
Id. at 581-82.  
 272 Id. at 589-94.  
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so.’ ”273 However, there was a danger that such coercion would 
occur at the public school, where the state had such complete 
control over the graduation ceremony that the prayer became 
“a state-sanctioned religious exercise in which the student was 
left with no alternative but to submit.”274   
While there may be disagreement, as there was on the 
Court itself, about whether the school prayer rose to the level of 
coercion, what remains clear is that the Court’s preoccupation 
with coercion under the accommodation approach reflects a 
strong commitment to protecting people’s rights to deliberate 
about a diversity of religious views without undue state 
intervention. Thus, the Constitution’s religion clauses, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, provide protections that 
allow for the deliberation of religious truth, thereby making the 
justification from truth a viable possibility in the context of 
religion. 
VI.  APPLICATIONS 
Thus far, I have tried to formulate the legal foundations 
of the justification from truth for purposes of religious 
expression. Now I want to explain how this justification would 
possibly manifest itself in the case law. In doing so, I try to 
explain first how the justification would articulate its terms in 
a given set of case facts, and second, how the justification 
would serve as an adjudicative principle by deciding in favor of 
one party and against another. To offer as lucid of an account 
as possible, I begin with some relatively easy cases where the 
Supreme Court itself appeared to be applying a version of the 
justification from truth. I then move to cases where application 
of the justification from truth can generate new arguments for 
cases in which the Supreme Court relied on a different 
justification.  
A.  Religious Proselytism 
I want to start with the relatively easy cases where the 
Supreme Court itself has at least hinted that it was applying 
the justification from truth to religious expression. What 
makes these cases so amenable to this justification is that they 
involve proselytizing, that is, efforts to persuade the audience 
  
 273 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).  
 274 Id. at 597. 
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that a given religion is the truth.275 Cantwell v. Connecticut276 is 
an excellent example. A Jehovah’s Witness named Newton 
Cantwell, along with his two sons, played a phonographic 
record in an area where “about ninety per cent of the residents 
are Roman Catholics.”277 The record “included an attack on the 
Catholic religion.”278 Cantwell asked two men walking the 
street whether they would be interested in hearing the record, 
and they acquiesced.279 Upon hearing the record, both men 
“were incensed by the contents of the record and were tempted 
to strike Cantwell unless he went away.”280 Cantwell and his 
sons were charged with and convicted of invoking or inciting 
others to breach of the peace.281 
Their case eventually made its way to the Supreme 
Court.282 Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts overturned 
Cantwell’s conviction by offering a justification that departed 
in crucial ways from the Court’s standard justification for 
religious conscience. He wrote:  
We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily harm, 
no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse. 
On the contrary, we find only an effort to persuade a willing listener 
to buy a book or to contribute money in the interest of what 
Cantwell, however misguided others may think him, conceived to be 
true religion.  
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp 
differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the 
rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of 
view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to 
vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or 
state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have 
ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of 
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to 
  
 275 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “proselyte” as “to cause to come over 
or turn from one opinion, belief, creed, or party to another; esp. to convert from one 
religious faith or sect to another.” 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 
664.  
 276 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).  
 277 Id. at 301.  
 278 Id.  
 279 Id. at 302-03.  
 280 Id. at 303.  
 281 Id.  
 282 This was also the first Supreme Court case that made the right of free 
religious exercise applicable to states by incorporating the right through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See id. 
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enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a 
democracy.283  
What is intriguing about this opinion is Roberts’s apparent 
suggestion that the right of religious free exercise is not simply 
relevant for the religionist who wishes to espouse her faith. 
According to Roberts, religious expression can also profit the 
audience: “But the people of this nation have ordained in the 
light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and 
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to 
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the 
citizens of a democracy.”284 Here, Roberts seems to suggest that 
religious expression goes beyond being merely tolerated as an 
inevitable, if quirky, anomaly in a predominantly liberal 
secular culture.285 Rather, Roberts emphasizes the positive 
impact of religious expression by alluding to what I have called 
the justification from truth.  
A similar application of the justification from truth to 
religious expression appears in Marsh v. Alabama.286 In Marsh, 
a Jehovah’s Witness sought to distribute religious literature in 
a company town named Chickasaw.287 The stores in the town 
had posted the following sign: “This Is Private Property, and 
Without Written Permission, No Street, or Horse Vendor, 
Agent or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be Permitted.”288 After 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to comply with this sign, they 
were arrested for violating a state statute that made “it a crime 
to enter or remain on the premises of another after having been 
warned not to do so.”289 The Jehovah’s Witnesses eventually 
appealed their case to the Supreme Court.290 Justice Black for 
the Court phrased the issue in a way that alluded to his 
reliance on the justification from truth. He wrote, “Our 
question then narrows down to this: Can those people who live 
in or come to Chickasaw be denied freedom of press and 
religion simply because a single company has legal title to all 
the town?”291 Tellingly, Black located the right of religious free 
  
 283 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311.  
 284 Id. at 310. 
 285 So bemoans Stephen Carter. See CARTER, supra note 134, at 21-22.  
 286 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946).  
 287 Id. at 502. 
 288 Id. at 503.  
 289 Id. at 503-04.  
 290 Id. at 503. 
 291 Id. at 505 (emphasis added).  
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exercise not just in the speaker but also in the audience, and 
thus implied that the audience has a right to hear and read 
religious expression, including a diversity of such expression. 
Black made this assumption explicit later in his opinion. After 
rejecting the arrests as violative of the right of free exercise, he 
wrote:  
Many people in the United States live in company-owned towns. 
These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of 
their State and country. Just as all other citizens they must make 
decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation. To act 
as good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be 
properly informed their information must be uncensored.292  
Just as Justice Roberts in Cantwell explained that religious 
expression is necessary for “citizens of a democracy” to form 
“enlightened opinions,” Black reasoned that religious 
expression is important in order for people “to act as good 
citizens” who are “informed.”293 Cases like this involving 
religious proselytizing have marshaled some version of the 
justification from truth, although without elaborating its logic 
and foundations.294 But what should we make of those cases 
that do not involve proselytizing? I take them up next.  
B.  Non-Proselytizing and No Intent to Persuade  
The previous discussion might lead one to believe that 
the justification from truth is inappropriate for speech that 
does not deliberately seek to proselytize. Indeed, all of the 
political speech and commercial speech cases that I have 
discussed involved speakers who were deliberately trying to 
persuade others through speeches, leaflets, and the like. Yet, as 
I argue later, even if someone has no intent to persuade others, 
her speech or expression can inform an audience and stimulate 
deliberation. Therefore, the justification from truth should be 
applied to these examples as well.  
When speakers have not deliberately sought to 
communicate a message to others, the Supreme Court, if it 
  
 292 Id. at 508.  
 293 Id. 
 294 See, e.g., Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 
632 (1980) (“Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable 
regulation but the latter must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that 
solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive 
speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, 
political, or social issues . . . .”).  
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wishes to protect the expression, might be tempted to apply 
what I call the justification from conscience. According to this 
justification, the Court protects the First Amendment rights of 
a speaker so that she may be faithful to her conscience.295 An 
example of such a speaker is found in Henry David Thoreau. 
Thoreau urged people to accept jail confinement rather than 
underwrite through their taxes a government that sanctions 
slavery:  
I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men 
whom I could name,—if ten honest men only,—ay, if one HONEST 
man, in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold slaves, were to 
[refuse to pay his taxes] and be locked up in the county jail therefore, 
it would be the abolition of slavery in America. For it matters not 
how small the beginning may seem to be: what is once well done is 
done forever.296  
Here, the act of civil disobedience is performed not primarily to 
benefit the community, for one man’s lone decision to serve jail 
time hardly signals “the abolition of slavery in America.” 
Rather, the dramatic gesture is meant to cleanse one’s 
conscience.297 It is an act to demonstrate both to the community 
and to one’s self what one is really made of. The speech act is 
thus not simply expressive but also affirmative of one’s moral 
conscience.  
A similar understanding regarding the significance of 
speech acts informs the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cohen v. 
California.298 There, the Court reversed the prosecution of one 
Robert Cohen who violated a disturbance of the peace statute 
for wearing in a Los Angeles courthouse a jacket emblazoned 
with the words “Fuck the Draft.”299 Justice Harlan for the Court 
reasoned that the First Amendment protected Cohen’s 
expression, and part of his justification stemmed from the view 
that Cohen’s message contained “inexpressible emotions.”300 In 
thus characterizing Cohen’s speech, Harlan did not appear to 
regard the speech as trying to convey a meaning to an 
audience, for the emotion in Cohen’s speech was said to be 
  
 295 See supra note 11 (2d paragraph).  
 296 Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in COLLECTED ESSAYS AND 
POEMS 203, 212 (Elizabeth Hall Witherell ed., Library of America 2001) (1849).  
 297 For related discussion, see HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 58-
68 (1972). 
 298 403 U.S. 15 (1971).  
 299 Id. at 16.  
 300 Id. at 26. 
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“inexpressible.” Pregnant with inexpressible emotions, the 
speech was better understood as trying to affirm the nonverbal 
passions of Cohen’s conscience, and Harlan’s opinion is best 
interpreted as an attempt to make legal space for such 
affirmation.  
But there is an important ambivalence that complicates 
the assumption that Cohen is merely a case about affirming 
one’s conscience. Harlan wrote that Cohen’s speech also 
involved a “communicative function” and his profanity might 
have been “the more important element of the overall message 
sought to be communicated.”301 Furthermore, Harlan stated 
that the right of free speech is “designed and intended to 
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public 
discussion . . . .”302 This sort of conceptual ambivalence is 
reproduced in other examples involving political speech that 
are partially underwritten by the justification from conscience.  
Consider Thoreau’s decision to go to jail rather than to 
pay taxes that would indirectly support slavery. As I have 
suggested, his jail time could not, as he claimed, amount to “the 
abolition of slavery in America” and is better understood as an 
act of moral self-fulfillment, a cleansing of his conscience. But 
it was more than that. For Thoreau attempted to justify, not 
simply to himself, but to others, his refusal to pay taxes, and he 
attempted to urge other men to follow his lead as a means of 
asserting their morally informed manhood against an evil 
state. That Thoreau’s rhetoric is sometimes shrill and 
indignant must not obscure his desire to urge others to political 
action.303  
  
 301 Id. at 25-26 (citing Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 
(1944)). 
 302 Id. at 24.  
 303 An important reason why political speech tends to resist classification as 
nothing other than the affirmation of one’s conscience is because politics is not 
conventionally understood as an enterprise that involves a single individual, nor one 
where the value of expression resides solely in the lone individual. Politics necessarily 
involves living and working with others, as suggested by its definition. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines “political” as follows: “Of, belonging, or pertaining to the 
state or body of citizens, its government and policy . . . .” 12 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 32. Also, an erstwhile definition of “politics” is given as 
the “public or social ethics, that branch of moral philosophy dealing with the state or 
social organism as a whole (obs.).” Id. These descriptions suggest an association with 
others, and hence a working together with them.  
  This concept is captured well in Aristotle’s observation that “man is by 
nature a political animal,” meaning that the human being by nature desires to live 
with others. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 37 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chi. Press, 
1984). For one “who is incapable of participating nor who is in need of nothing through 
being self-sufficient is no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god.” Id. Tellingly, 
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In the context of religious acts, the Court has sometimes 
justified the right of religious expression in terms of the 
justification from conscience. Consider once more Thomas v. 
Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division.304 
While factually quite different from the profanity of Cohen, the 
religious dimension in Thomas was regarded by the Court as 
presenting a similar question of conscience. One Eddie Thomas 
was a foundry worker in Indiana who was transferred from 
making steel sheeting to making tank gun turrets.305 As a 
Jehovah’s Witness, he refused to participate in activities that 
would contribute to war. Thomas quit his job and sought 
unemployment benefits.306 The Indiana Supreme Court refused 
to permit the dispensing of such benefits because “ ‘although 
the claimant’s reasons for quitting were described as religious, 
it was unclear what his belief was, and what the religious basis 
of his belief was.’”307 The confusion or doubt is quite excusable, 
for how could producing steel sheeting that could be added to a 
tank’s armor differ morally from building its turret in terms of 
leading to its construction and hence its availability for 
assault? Besides, the Indiana Supreme Court could point to 
another Jehovah’s Witness who had no qualms about making 
turrets.308 Still, on appeal, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the 
United States Supreme Court, reversed the Indiana Supreme 
Court, stating that  
Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew 
was an unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake to dissect 
religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is “struggling” 
with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the 
clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might 
employ.309 
  
Aristotle points to “speech” as the defining characteristic of man’s status as a political 
animal, because “man alone among the animals has speech,” and it is speech that 
permits us to communicate to each other the “advantageous and the harmful, and 
hence also the just and the unjust.” See id. What makes speech political here is its 
capacity to communicate ideas to others. This is not to say that your criticizing the 
president while you are on a deserted island is not political speech; in terms of its 
content, it obviously is. It is instead to suggest that we tend to value political speech 
because such speech can persuade and inform an audience. 
 304 450 U.S. 707 (1981).  
 305 Id. at 709. 
 306 Id. at 710. 
 307 Id. at 741 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. 
Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind. 1979)). 
 308 Id. at 715.  
 309 Id.  
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Here, Chief Justice Burger does not justify Thomas’s 
expression as constitutionally protected because it is likely to 
persuade or cause to reflect anyone who witnesses it; Burger 
thus avoids the justification from truth. Burger instead 
justifies his decision by turning to the justification from 
conscience. He seems to imply that no one—including other 
Jehovah’s Witnesses—would necessarily even understand 
Thomas’s actions as coherent. The action is constitutionally 
protected, it seems, largely because it is the way that Thomas 
himself has come to terms with his religion.310 It seems 
instinctively right to justify religious expression in terms of the 
justification from conscience.  
On the other hand, there is something curious about 
justifying the right of religious expression exclusively in terms 
of conscience and not the justification from truth. For religious 
speech, like political speech, can inform and persuade its 
audience. And here we need not just invoke the familiar idea of 
religious proselytism. We can also imagine how the audience 
can learn from the religious expression of someone whose 
primary motivation is not to educate others. Recall that Chief 
Justice Burger justified Thomas’s right of religious expression 
as a means of being faithful to the latter’s religious conscience, 
but he could have just as well invoked the justification from 
truth. While Burger conceded that Thomas’s refusal might not 
have been necessitated by his religion and might have been 
wanting in coherence, the message was nonetheless clear in its 
general meaning: helping to build military weapons violates 
the Jehovah’s Witness commitment to pacifism and it is better 
to lose one’s job than to betray God’s wishes. Even if Thomas 
did not intend to inform or persuade others, it is possible for 
some to infer and reflect upon the meaning of his resistance. 
People may be inspired—or angered—by Thomas’s religious 
expression, and they may come to realize, for example, that 
they are insufficiently serious about their own religions, or that 
they should not be zealous like Thomas. Either way, people 
might find reflecting about Thomas’s religious expression to be 
theoretically more rewarding and intense than the sort of 
political speech and commercial speech that is underwritten by 
  
 310 This justification must logically depend on the assumption that Thomas’s 
religious expression is a means of being faithful to his conscience, and that it does not 
stem from a desire to avoid strenuous or dangerous activity or to avoid being under the 
control of an overbearing supervisor.  
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the justification from truth.311 Indeed, it seems inaccurate to 
classify Thomas’s expression as merely religious, as if religious 
speech were somehow concerned only with religious topics. 
Thomas’s speech is also pregnant with political meaning: he 
would prefer to lose his job than to do the government’s 
military bidding. It is therefore not entirely clear why the 
Court justified Thomas’s expression as simply an exercise in 
religious conscience. Furthermore, similar to political speech, 
Thomas’s expression is fully capable of helping the audience to 
arrive at some conclusion about truth, namely, that state-
sponsored violence is unacceptable to those who take seriously 
their religiously informed pacifism.  
A similar kind of inference can be derived from West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, a case where the 
Court recognized religious speech as protected by both the right 
of religious expression and the right of free speech.312 As in 
Thomas, the Court relied on the justification from conscience, 
not truth, but the justification from truth would have been 
perfectly serviceable. Like Thomas, Barnette involved 
religionists who sought to be faithful to their consciences. The 
West Virginia State Board of Education had passed a 
resolution that required students and teachers to salute the 
American flag as a regular part of classroom business.313 This 
rule conflicted with the religious convictions of the Barnette 
children who were Jehovah’s Witnesses.314  
Justice Jackson for the Court rejected as 
unconstitutional the compulsory flag salute, reasoning that it 
unjustifiably coerced the Jehovah’s Witnesses into doing 
something that contradicted their religious consciences. The 
required salute, Jackson announced, “invades the sphere of 
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First 
  
 311 Imagine viewing a series of dull political sound bites for a series of 
indistinguishable candidates or, worse, viewing a steady stream of commercials for five 
different kinds of light beer.  
 312 Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943).  
 313  Id. at 626. 
 314 The beliefs of the Jehovah’s Witnesses  
include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which says: 
“Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of 
anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in 
the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve 
them.” They consider that the flag is an “image” within this command. For 
this reason they refuse to salute it. 
 Id.  
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Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official 
control.”315 Jackson also proclaimed, “If there is any fixed star 
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”316 By 
“invading the sphere of intellect and spirit” and by “forcing 
citizens to confess” to practices that they find to be sinful, the 
compulsory flag salute punishes a commitment to one’s 
conscience in two respects: It compels the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
to express a meaning which directly violates their religious 
consciences and it prohibits them from expressing what they 
believe their religious consciences tell them is right.  
While the Jehovah’s Witness children may not have 
sought to convey any meaning to their classmates or to the 
school staff, their refusal was nonetheless clearly expressive: A 
close reading of the Bible should preclude responsible 
Jehovah’s Witnesses from paying homage to any graven image 
of state-sponsored nationalism, and not even the threat of 
school expulsion should deter them. Like the case of Eddie 
Thomas, even if the Barnette children did not intend to inform 
or persuade others, it is possible for some to infer and reflect 
upon the meaning of their resistance. Their expression is 
relevant to the audience’s process of deliberating about some 
truth, namely, that one’s devotion to God must be complete and 
is not compatible with an extant devotion to emblems of a 
coerced nationalism. Thus the justification from truth could 
have persuasively been applied in this case, just as it could 
have been applied in many other cases involving non-
proselytizing speech.  
C.  Public Elementary, Middle, and High Schools 
Applying the justification from truth to the religious 
expression of the Barnette children, as I did previously, would 
seem especially apt given that schools are places that the 
Supreme Court has recognized as valuable, and perhaps 
uniquely so, for the exchange of diverse ideas and viewpoints. 
  
 315 Id. at 642.  
 316 Id. Jackson also wrote: “To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are 
required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his 
own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his 
mind.” Id. at 634.  
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In Ambach v. Norwick, the Supreme Court spoke of “the public 
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system . . . .”317 This may 
involve recognizing public schools “as an ‘assimilative force’ by 
which diverse and conflicting elements in our society are 
brought together on a broad but common ground.”318 And in 
Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Court similarly observed 
that the public schools should aspire to teach the “fundamental 
values of ‘habits and manners of civility’ essential to a 
democratic society [which] must, of course, include tolerance of 
divergent political and religious views, even when the views 
expressed may be unpopular.”319  
But if the justification from truth were to be employed 
to defend a government law that requires public school 
students to learn about religious diversity, how deeply should 
the justification cut against a right to resist such exposure? 
The answer to this question obviously depends on the facts. 
Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools provides a usefully 
heuristic example where the justification would survive 
scrutiny.320 In 1983, the Hawkins County School Board in 
Tennessee voted to require all students to take “character 
education” courses.321 The purpose of the courses was “to help 
each student develop positive values and to improve student 
conduct as students learn to act in harmony with their positive 
values and learn to become good citizens in their school, 
community, and society.”322 The school board specifically 
intended for the courses to use a textbook published by the 
Holt Rinehart company in a manner that instilled critical 
reading.323 Vicki Frost agreed that critical reading was 
important but argued that her children’s First Amendment 
rights of free exercise were being infringed upon by being 
required to learn material that was “in violation of their 
  
 317 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979).  
 318 Id. (citing JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 26 (Macmillan 
1929)). 
 319 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (citing 
CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 
(1944)). 
 320 Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Sch., 827 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (6th Cir. 
1987).  
 321 Id. at 1060. 
 322 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1007 (Supp. 1986).  
 323 Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060.  
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religious beliefs and convictions.”324 As a born-again Christian, 
Frost condemned the Holt textbook mainly because it contained 
“stories that develop ‘a religious tolerance that all religions are 
merely different roads to God.’”325 She announced, “We cannot 
be tolerant in that we accept other religious views on an equal 
basis with ours.”326 Hence, Frost essentially rejected the 
justification from truth as inapplicable in this instance. She 
insisted that she and her children were already in possession of 
the truth about religion and a diversity of competing religious 
views would only confuse and subvert her children.  
Chief Judge Lively for the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals did not agree and he provided persuasive reasons for 
his conclusion. He reasoned that the Supreme Court’s reference 
to the “tolerance of divergent . . . religious views” in Bethel 
School District was a “civil tolerance, not a religious one.”327 As 
such, the tolerance taught by the teachers in the Hawkins 
County School District “does not require a person to accept any 
other religion as the equal of the one to which that person 
adheres.”328 All that it requires is “a recognition that in a 
pluralistic society we must ‘live and let live.’”329 Lively added 
that if “the Hawkins County schools had required the plaintiff 
students either to believe or say they believe that ‘all religions 
are merely different roads to God,’ this would be a different 
case.”330 But there was no evidence to suggest that the school 
compelled such affirmation.331 Rather, Chief Judge Lively 
stated that the “only conduct compelled by the defendants was 
reading and discussing the material in the Holt series, and 
hearing other students’ interpretations of those materials,” and 
it was this “exposure to which the plaintiffs objected.”332 In 
other words, the Frost children were never coerced to accept 
the “truth” on offer in the textbook. They were theoretically 
free to criticize whatever ostensive truth was brought before 
  
 324 Id. at 1061.  
 325 Id. at 1068.  
 326 Id. at 1069.  
 327 Id. 
 328 Id. 
 329 Id. 
 330 Id. 
 331 The Court noted with regard to Frost’s concern “that she did not want her 
children to make critical judgments and exercise choices in areas where the Bible 
provides the answer. There is no evidence that any child in the Hawkins County 
schools was required to make such judgments.” Id. at 1069.  
 332 Id.  
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them. The justification from truth, then, is most appropriate 
when it invites perusal over different options, not when it 
compels affirmation of those options.  
1. When the Majority Coerces the Minority 
Lest my rendering of Mozert appear to evince a hidden 
sympathy for the state, I want to clarify that the justification 
from truth also prohibits the state from infringing on people’s 
opportunities to retain the psychological resources necessary 
for ascertaining some truth about religion. In contrast to 
Mozert, Lee v. Weisman333 represents a case in which the 
justification from truth would be insufficient to overcome a 
student’s resistance to religious expression. Recall that the 
principal of a public middle school had asked a rabbi to give a 
nondenominational prayer during a graduation ceremony.334 
Though the school had sought to convey a feeling of 
“inclusiveness and sensitivity” through the prayer, Justice 
Kennedy rejected the prayer as a violation of the 
Establishment Clause. For in “this atmosphere the state-
imposed character of an invocation and benediction by clergy 
selected by the school combine to make the prayer a state-
sanctioned religious exercise in which the student was left with 
no alternative but to submit.”335 As stated before, the 
justification from truth is most appropriate in those settings 
where the audience is being challenged to consider competing 
or alternative viewpoints and where the audience feels 
comfortable enough to deliberate about those viewpoints.336 In 
Mozert, the audience, including the Frost children, had access 
to a diversity of viewpoints about religion, especially those 
viewpoints that would have been considered culturally outside 
the norm for many children reared in a place like Hawkins 
County, Tennessee,337 and the students were permitted and, at 
least in theory, even invited to challenge those viewpoints.  
The facts of Lee are different, however. First, unlike the 
educational enterprise of Mozert, the school prayer in Lee was 
  
 333 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  
 334 See supra notes 270-274 and accompanying text.  
 335 Lee, 505 U.S. at 597. 
 336 See supra Part I. 
 337 Hawkins County had a population of 53,563 in 2000, of which 60% was 
rural and only 3.3% comprised racial minorities. Hawkins County Industrial Board, 
http://www.hawkinscounty.org/development/population.html (last visited Aug. 25, 
2007). 
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primarily, if not solely, a ceremonial event meant to enshrine a 
set of religious truths. The prayer was comprised of an 
“Invocation” and a “Benediction,” and the language in both 
gives away the ceremonial nature of the prayer.338 Even the 
part of the prayer that recognizes the importance of protecting 
diversity, including presumably atheism and agnosticism, is 
regarded as the product of God’s beneficence: “For the legacy of 
America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of 
minorities are protected, we thank You.”339 To be sure, the 
nature of the religious expression in Thomas and Barnette is 
similar to the prayer in Lee in that all three never consciously 
sought to educate the public. However, unlike Lee, the 
expressions in Thomas and Barnette were those of a religious 
minority. Whereas the prayer in Lee had the support of the 
school and the majority of the student body and the parents, 
the expressions in Thomas and Barnette provoked 
bewilderment and dismissal in the former and an angry 
intolerance in the latter.340 Furthermore, the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in both cases provoked such responses precisely 
because they refused to acquiesce to the wishes of the majority 
and the state. Perhaps most importantly, whereas those who 
belonged to the mainstream religions would not have felt 
coerced to believe or disbelieve the meaning of the Jehovah’s 
Witness expressions in Thomas and Barnette, those non-
believers in Lee would have been much more likely to have felt 
coerced into outwardly participating in the religious ceremony. 
This conclusion tends to distinguish my formulation of 
the justification from truth from that of Professor Marshall, 
who is one of the few professors to have applied the 
justification to the religion clauses. He argues:  
[A] search for truth rationale would undercut the religious claims of 
some groups that they have a constitutional right to be insulated 
from societal forces that affect all other ideologies. Specifically, it 
would suggest that . . . the fundamentalist claim in Mozert v. 
Hawkins County Public Schools [is] seriously weakened if not 
entirely misplaced. [For] the religious claim being advanced was that 
there was a free exercise right not to be exposed to ideas that would 
purportedly threaten the integrity of the religious community. The 
  
 338 See supra note 271 and accompanying text.  
 339 For the full text, see supra note 271. 
 340 See supra Part VI.B. 
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validity of this argument would be very much in doubt if the Religion 
Clauses were premised on a search for truth rationale.341  
Under my approach, what makes Vicki Frost’s claim in Mozert 
untenable is not that it rests on a desire to be immune from 
“ideas that would purportedly threaten the integrity of the 
religious community.” The claim is untenable for other reasons: 
first, because it rejects participation in a setting where 
religionists are required to consider a diversity of viewpoints 
about religion; and, second, because the setting in which they 
are so required lasts for the duration of a single class period in 
a public school that is formally dedicated to broadening the 
social outlook of its students. Neither of these two factors was 
present in Lee. Instead, Lee did the opposite in consolidating 
familiar religious perspectives that were prepared by a 
mainstream religious coalition of Christians and Jews.342 And 
the religious truths awaiting announcement in the school’s 
Invocation and Benediction were not introduced in a setting of 
tentative inquiry like in Mozert but were meant to be 
consecrated through collective ritual.  
For similar reasons, Bowers v. Hardwick343 and Harris v. 
McRae344 also cannot be underwritten by the justification from 
truth. Professor Marshall writes that    
the search for truth rationale supports the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion in cases such as Bowers v. Hardwick and Harris v. McRae 
that there is no constitutional violation in prohibitions against 
sodomy or abortion, respectively, solely because those prohibitions 
reflect religious principles. If there are to be limitations on the role of 
religion in the public sphere, those restrictions must be based on 
something other than the substance of religious ideas.345  
Quite true, but those restrictions would seem to inhere in the 
justification from truth itself, or at least the deliberative 
version that I defend. That is, the logic of the justification from 
truth, as I have defined it, contains normative restrictions on 
what forms of actions the state may express: actions that 
promote deliberation are justified, while those that undermine 
it are not. Bowers and Harris, like Lee, represent cases where 
the state has not produced the effect of inviting its audience to 
  
 341 Marshall, supra note 12, at 267-68 (footnotes omitted).  
 342 Lee, 505 U.S. at 581.  
 343 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 344 448 U.S. 297 (1980).  
 345 Marshall, supra note 12, at 266-67 (footnotes omitted).  
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deliberate about a diversity of viewpoints or has no interest in 
doing so. Rather, the state in both cases was instead 
determined to transform its religious preferences into the force 
of legal sanctions.  
In Bowers, Georgia had passed an anti-sodomy statute 
that its attorney general acknowledged would be applied only 
to homosexuals.346 Concurring, Chief Justice Burger upheld the 
law as speaking to our traditional Judeo-Christian abhorrence 
of homosexuality.347 If the Georgia statute were indeed 
prompted by such dread, it could not in my view find support 
from the justification from truth. For, like the school-mandated 
prayer in Lee, the anti-sodomy statute was not meant to 
introduce a provocative minority perspective that would induce 
public deliberation. The statute was meant to stifle such 
deliberation by simply asserting the rightness of its own 
religious preferences, and, worse, it wielded the threat of 
criminal conviction and public humiliation against those who 
refused to obey it.  
A similar dynamic was at play in Harris. There, 
Congress passed a law prohibiting the federal government from 
funding abortions except to save the life of the mother or for 
victims of rape or incest.348 If the law were passed to further a 
Christian condemnation of abortion, the statute would not be 
defensible under my version of the justification from truth. 
Analogous to the state’s conduct in Lee and Bowers, the state in 
Harris had little, if any, desire to provoke deliberation about 
some minority perspective, nor can we seriously assume that 
such deliberation was the statute’s probable effect. The state’s 
aims are better described as principally administrative in 
placing potentially debilitating obstacles before those who seek 
abortions. Thus, the justification from truth should not be 
applied in all cases in which speech is religious, especially 
when the majority is imposing its views on the minority.  
2.  A Limited Diversity: Why Creation Science Can  
Be Excluded 
I have argued for a diversity of religious viewpoints, but 
a boundless diversity cannot be managed in practice because 
  
 346 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 201.  
 347 Id. at 196-97 (Burger, J., concurring).  
 348 Harris, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980) (citing Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 
926 (1979)).  
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there are not enough resources to accommodate them all. There 
are some viewpoints that must be excluded or given low 
priority even if they represent minority perspectives. On a 
certain level of abstraction, the process of ranking viewpoints 
is, I suppose, normatively inconsistent with the project of 
encouraging a diversity of viewpoints that I have espoused thus 
far. Yet such tension need not condemn us to utter confusion, 
either. The Supreme Court illustrates how one can embrace a 
diversity of viewpoints without affording legal protection for 
every single viewpoint. Even under the justification from truth 
as applied to secular speech, the Court has denied 
constitutional protection, for example, to fighting words,349 
libel,350 and obscenity.351 In each of these settings, the Court has 
stated that the speech, while bursting with meaning, possesses 
the sort of meaning that is incompatible with the 
administrative and normative priorities of civil society.352   
Like the Court, I can provide reasons for excluding some 
viewpoints and, thus, preferring one conception of diversity 
over another. I can illustrate this practice by trying to justify 
the exclusion of creation science and intelligent design as 
meaningful scientific theories from public high schools, middle 
schools, and elementary schools. Whereas evolutionists believe 
that humans evolved from natural causes, advocates for 
creation science and intelligent design argue that some 
intelligent Being that was anterior to the existence of anything 
is responsible for the creation and evolution of humans.353 
  
 349 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 568 (1942).  
 350 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact.”).  
 351 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 15 (1973).  
 352 Justice Murphy alluded to a consonant theme in Chaplinsky:  
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the 
libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words-those which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 
315 U.S. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted). 
 353 Duane T. Gish, an advocate for creation science, juxtaposes his position 
with that of evolutionists: “Creation theory postulates . . . that all basic animal and 
plant types (the created kinds) were brought into being by the acts of a preexisting 
Being by means of special processes that are not operative today.” Duane T. Gish, 
Creation, Evolution, and the Historical Evidence, in BUT IS IT SCIENCE?, supra note 
108, at 266, 266. William Dembski, a believer in intelligent design, also subscribes to a 
similar view: “From observable features of the natural world, intelligent design infers 
to an intelligence responsible for those features. The world contains events, objects and 
structures that exhaust the explanatory resources of undirected natural causes and 
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Creation scientists tend to differ from believers in intelligent 
design in that the former sometimes assert that science can 
support a literal interpretation of the Bible,354 whereas the 
latter claim more guardedly that science points to an 
intelligent Being, whose aims or values are unknowable, as the 
cause of the universe.355 I dwell on their similarities, though, 
because there is a fatal flaw in their common premise that 
science points to a Higher Being as the creator of our known 
universe and everything in it.  
To return to the Article’s theme, I want to argue in this 
section that creation science can be rejected on the grounds of 
  
that can be adequately explained only by recourse to intelligent causes.” WILLIAM A. 
DEMBSKI, INTELLIGENT DESIGN: THE BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY 107 
(1999).  
 354 Henry M. Morris, the Director of the Institute for Creation Research, is a 
good example. He states: “The Bible is the Word of God, absolutely inerrant and 
verbally inspired . . . The Bible gives us the revelation we need, and it will be found 
that all the known facts of science or history can be very satisfactorily understood 
within this Biblical framework.” HENRY M. MORRIS, EVOLUTION AND THE MODERN 
CHRISTIAN 55 (1967), quoted in Joel Cracraft, The Scientific Response to Creationism, 
in CREATIONISM, SCIENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ARKANSAS CASE 138, 139 (Marcel 
Chotkowski La Follette ed., 1983). Elsewhere, Morris writes that creation science 
supports the Bible’s account of Genesis and Noah’s Flood. SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM 
205-08, 213 (Henry M. Morris ed., 1974).  
 355 William Dembski, a proponent of intelligent design, writes:  
In the past design was a plausible but underdeveloped philosophical 
intuition. Now it is a robust program of scientific research. Consequently 
intelligent design is under no obligation to speculate about the nature, moral 
character or purposes of any designing intelligence it happens to infer. (Here 
rather is a task for the theologian—to connect the intelligence inferred by the 
design theorist with the God of Scripture.) Indeed this is one of the great 
strengths of intelligent design, that it distinguishes design from purpose. We 
can know that something is designed without knowing the ultimate or even 
proximate purpose for which it was designed. 
DEMBSKI, supra note 353, at 107-08. Still, in other places, Dembski clearly evinces his 
prioritization of Christianity, and thus implies that his “scientific” endeavors are 
meant less to find the truth, whatever it may be, than to vindicate his religious faith:  
If we take seriously the word-flesh Christology of Chalcedon (i.e., the doctrine 
that Christ is fully human and fully divine) and view Christ as the telos 
toward which God is drawing the whole of creation, then any view of the 
sciences that leaves Christ out of the picture must be seen as fundamentally 
deficient. 
Id. at 206 (footnotes omitted). And the self-styled creation scientist Henry Morris 
sometimes poses like a more dispassionate advocate of intelligent design when he 
writes that the purpose of “scientific creationism” “is, first, to treat all of the more 
pertinent aspects of the subject of origins and to do this solely on a scientific basis, with 
no references to the Bible or to religious doctrine.” SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 
354, at 3. This is the sort of promiscuous affinity between intelligent design and 
creation science that leads me to believe that, notwithstanding the differences in their 
names, their advocates are often people who share more or less the same aspirations 
and beliefs about their work.  
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employing a diversity of viewpoints to discover the truth. For it 
is my contention that creation science fails to contribute to a 
meaningful diversity of views in public schools insofar as it is 
presented as a legitimate or potentially legitimate statement 
about “science.” As I will show, creation science, like libel, has 
the tendency to mislead the audience with false statements 
because it styles itself a science but contains none of the 
standard indicia of science. In this way, just as we may exclude 
libel from constitutional protection even though it may 
contribute to a diversity of viewpoints, so we may also exclude 
creation science from being taught in public elementary, 
middle, and high schools.  
I can begin to explain my argument by turning to 
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education.356 In 1981, Arkansas 
passed the “Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and 
Evolution-Science Act.”357 As its name suggests, the Act 
appeared to make a formal bid for a diversity of viewpoints—a 
“balanced treatment” of opposing perspectives—an assumption 
reinforced by its professed aims. In solemnly progressive tones, 
the statute is studded with the tropes of innocent intellectual 
curiosity. It makes reference to respect for different values, 
aspirations to epistemic neutrality, and even a desire for the 
“search for truth”:  
This Legislature enacts this Act for public schools [with] the purpose 
of protecting academic freedom for students’ differing values and 
beliefs; ensuring neutrality toward students’ diverse religious 
convictions; ensuring freedom of religious exercise for students and 
their parents; guaranteeing freedom of belief and speech for 
students; preventing establishment of Theologically Liberal, 
Humanist, Nontheist, or Atheist religions; preventing discrimination 
against students on the basis of their personal beliefs concerning 
creation and evolution; and assisting students in their search for 
truth. This Legislature does not have the purpose of causing 
instruction in religious concepts or making an establishment of 
religion.358  
Section 1 of the Act continues this endorsement of 
diversity and balance of viewpoints, requiring that public 
schools give “balanced treatment” to both theories of 
evolution.359 Such language would imply that the Arkansas 
  
 356 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).  
 357 Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act, ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 80-1663 (Supp. 1981).  
 358 Id. 
 359 The law reads:  
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legislature was merely interested in doing what I have sought 
to do throughout the Article: urge the merits of deliberation 
about a diversity of viewpoints. But upon closer inspection this 
conclusion is not quite right. For the statute misleadingly 
ascribes the characteristics of that which is properly called 
science to “creation science.” So declares section 7(j):  
Creation-science is an alternative scientific model of origins and can 
be presented from a strictly scientific standpoint without any 
religious doctrine just as evolution-science can, because there are 
scientists who conclude that scientific data best support creation-
science and because scientific evidences and inferences have been 
presented for creation-science.360  
Section 4(a) outlined the scientific qualities of creation 
science:  
“Creation-science” means the scientific evidences for creation and 
inferences from those scientific evidences. Creation-science includes 
the scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate: (1) 
Sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life from nothing . . . .361  
To assess the scientific merits of this claim, Judge Overton for 
the district court first provided a definition of science by which 
they could be compared. After deliberating the expert 
testimony, he summarized “the essential characteristics of 
science”:  
(1) It is guided by natural law; (2) It has to be explanatory by 
reference to natural law; (3) It is testable against the empirical 
world; (4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e., are not necessarily the 
final word; and (5) It is falsifiable.362 
The claims by creation science in McLean could not comport 
with these requirements. Most damagingly, creation science 
could not be justified as based on “natural law.” For the 
Arkansas statute insists in section 4(a)(1) that the “[s]udden 
  
Public schools within this State shall give balanced treatment to creation-
science and to evolution-science. Balanced treatment to these two models 
shall be given in classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in 
textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in library materials 
taken as a whole for the sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities, 
and in other educational programs in public schools, to the extent that such 
lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational programs deal in any 
way with the subject of the origin of man, life, the earth, or the universe.  
Id.  
 360 Id.  
 361 Id.  
 362 McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267 (E.D. Ark. 1982). 
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creation of the universe, energy, and life” derives from 
“nothing,” and thus insists too that a force that is anterior to 
nature itself has created human beings and the universe which 
they know. What the logic of creation science relies on, then, is 
an appeal to divine intervention, the only force that can create 
the universe out of “nothing.”363 As such, there is no way to test 
the conclusion that God created the universe since there is 
literally “nothing” to test as a proposition about physical 
matter.364 Therefore, creation science, unlike conventional 
science, is not falsifiable.365 For the same reason, it is not 
  
 363 Judge Overton explained that creation science “is not science because it 
depends upon a supernatural intervention which is not guided by natural law. It is not 
explanatory by reference to natural law, is not testable and is not falsifiable.” Id. 
 364 As Judge Overton stated: “If the unifying idea of supernatural creation by 
God is removed from Section 4, the remaining parts of the section explain nothing and 
are meaningless assertions.” Id. 
 365 The zoologist Stephen Jay Gould, a trial witness against Arkansas in 
MacLean, delivered an especially keen critique of creation science:  
“Scientific creationism” is a self-contradictory, nonsense phrase precisely 
because it cannot be falsified. I can envision observations and experiments 
that would disprove any evolutionary theory I know, but I cannot imagine 
what potential data could lead creationists to abandon their beliefs. 
Unbeatable systems are dogma, not science. Lest I seem harsh or rhetorical, I 
quote creationism’s leading intellectual. Duane Gish, Ph.D., from his recent 
(1978) book, Evolution? The Fossils Say No! “By creation we mean the 
bringing into being by a supernatural Creator of the basic kinds of plants and 
animals by the process of sudden, or fiat, creation. We do not know how the 
Creator created, what processes He used, for He used processes which are not 
now operating anywhere in the natural universe [Gish’s italics]. This is why 
we refer to creation as special creation. We cannot discover by scientific 
investigations anything about the creative processes used by the Creator.” 
Pray tell, Dr. Gish, in the light of your last sentence, what then is “scientific” 
creationism?  
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, HEN’S TEETH AND HORSE’S TOES, 253-62 (1983) (quotation on 
256-57); Joel Cracraft, a science adviser to the American Civil Liberties Union who 
challenged the Arkansas statute describes the operations of the statute as follows: 
No longer can science construct explanatory hypotheses about events having 
a time dimension—to creationists, science must study only the observable, 
only that which can be verified in a laboratory experiment. No longer must 
scientific ideas, or conjectures, be subject to criticism and eventual rejection—
some statements, such as those derived from revelation, are not only to be 
considered scientific in their content, but also impervious to criticism.  
Joel Cracraft, The Scientific Response to Creationism, in CREATIONISM, SCIENCE, AND 
THE LAW: THE ARKANSAS CASE 138, 139 (Marcel C. La Follette ed., 1983). The 
philosopher of science Michael Ruse was an expert witness against Arkansas. During 
cross examination, Ruse responded:  
First, and most importantly, creation science necessarily looks to the 
supernatural acts of a Creator. According to creation-science theory, the 
Creator has intervened in supernatural ways using supernatural forces. 
Moreover, because the supernatural forces are the acts of a Creator, that is, 
the acts of God, they are not subject to scientific investigation or 
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tentative in its conclusions, as is science, but instead provides 
that God is the final word.366 Creation science can thus be 
rejected as something that students should learn in public 
schools in order to enrich their knowledge of science. This is not 
to suggest that there is no cultural or religious value to 
creationism or that those who believe it are necessarily wrong. 
Rather, it is to suggest that an inherently religious account of 
the origins of the universe should be regarded as founded on its 
unique epistemic resources of faith, not empirical science. Or, 
to state the objection in terms of my discussion of scientific 
paradigms,367 creation science attempts to conscript the 
paradigm of science to make sense of claims that are inherently 
resistant to the logic of science.368  
  
understanding. This nonscientific aspect of creation science emerges quite 
clearly from the creation-science literature I have read.  
Michael Ruse, Witness Testimony Sheet, McLean v. Arkansas, in BUT IS IT SCIENCE?, 
supra note 108, at 287, 304. Ruse has made similar arguments elsewhere. See RUSE, 
DARWINISM DEFENDED, supra note 108, at 322 (arguing that the reliance on miracles 
by creation scientists “lie[s] outside of science, which by definition deals only with the 
natural, the repeatable, that which is governed by law”). For an argument about how 
Darwinism provides a heuristic of falsifiability, see Sir Karl Popper, Darwinism as a 
Metaphysical Research Program, in BUT IS IT SCIENCE?, supra note 108, at 144, 145-47.  
 366 See supra notes 363-365 and accompanying text.  
 367 See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.  
 368 The theology professor Langdon Gilkey at the University of Chicago, a 
witness against Arkansas, explains:  
The creation-science “model” is . . . not an example of science at all; it 
involves a supra-natural cause, transcendent to the system of finite causes; it 
explains in terms of purposes and intentions; and it cites a transcendent, 
unique, and unrepeatable—even in principle, uncontrollable—action. It 
represents, therefore, logically and linguistically, a re-edition of a familiar 
form—that is, “natural theology,” which argues that certain data point 
“rationally” to a philosophical/religious conclusion, namely, to the agency of a 
divine being. 
Second, the creationists fail to distinguish the question of ultimate origins 
(Where did it all come from?) from the quite different question of proximate 
origins (How did A arise out of B, if it did?). They ignore the (scholastic) 
distinction between the primary causality of a First Cause, with which 
philosophy or theology might deal, and secondary causality, which is 
causality confined to finite factors. Assuming that it is science’s role to deal 
with the truth and, therefore, with all of the truth, they conclude that a 
scientific explanation of origins must be an exhaustive explanation and must 
be inclusive of all possible related factors or causes. If evolution theory deals 
with proximate origins, it must also deal with the question of ultimate 
origins. If, in this process, evolution theory has left out God, then it must be 
asserting that there is no God, or that the divine is in no way the Creator of 
the process of secondary causes. At the Arkansas trial, the creationists 
therefore interpreted the scientific witnesses’ demurrals that “science does 
not raise the question about God at all” as meaning that science rules out the 
presence of God in any way.  
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The justification from truth, then, need not and, indeed, 
cannot accept every expression as equally likely to help the 
audience arrive at some truth.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The justification from truth can boast a distinguished 
pedigree and its theoretical potential is, in my view, powerful. 
It is also, as I have shown, the dominant basis of support in the 
Supreme Court for the right of free speech. Curiously, the 
justification has gone relatively ignored in the realm of 
religious expression. I have tried in this Article to apply the 
justification to religious expression, and I have suggested that 
by doing so we can arrive at better conclusions about the truth. 
  
Langdon Gilkey, The Creationist Controversy: The Interpretation of Inquiry and Belief, 
SCI., TECHNOLOGY, & HUMAN VALUES, Summer 1982, at 67, 68.  
